CHAPTER Ill, SECTION 5 On 1 April 1957 the responsibility of fire protection on David was assigned to the H&N Safety Department. All fire equipment belonging to the Military was returned and replaced by equipment furnished by AEC. Military and H&N personnel stationed at this site were instructed in the use of fire protection equipment and fire-fighting techniques, and weekly inspec- tions were made to check extinguishers, to make a general inspection of fire facilities, and to conduct routine training of personnel in fire pro- tection methods. With the closing of the Liquid Oxygen Plant at How,all fire prevention was transferred to Johnston Island. A Willys fire truck was later sent to Johnston Island to supplement existing fire protection. The rehabilitation of Johnston Island to the extent required to support that portion of Operation HARDTACK activities presented many safety problems not normally encountered at other camp sites. The potential for structural fires at this site was extreme primarily due to the limited land area available for the numberof facility installations. Normal winds sweep from one end of the island to the other and any fire, even moderately out of con- trol, could readily devastate the entire area. Other factors contributing to the critical aspects of fire hazards at Johnston Island were the limited access roadsfor fire equipment, extremely narrow roadways requiring constant enforcement of the “no parking” restrictions, the inability to isolate storage areas for combustibles, inadequate fire hydrants, fire wells, etc., and the high potential hazard of operational facilities. As a safeguard for personnel housed in the two-story wooden barracks, hourly fire patrols were scheduled during the hours of darkness, exterior fire escape stairways were installed at both ends of each building, emergency circuit fire phones were installed, and klaxon-type alarms were installed to effect quick evacuation of personnel. Prior to the operational period of HARDTACK, a Rad-safety Monitors’ Training School was conducted by the AEC Rad-safety Assistant and the H&N Rad-safety Officer to train personnel from the various divisions of H&N as Rad-safety Monitors for H&N work parties entering ‘“‘Radex” areas. During training, em- phasis was placed on recovery party operations, protective clothing and its use, medical aspects of radiation, decontamination, and radiation detection instruments. At the completion of the training course, 53 H&N personnel were available for duty as qualified Monitors. As of mid-July 1958, H&N Rad-safety Monitors at Eniwetok Atoll had accompanied 1463 persons on 209 missions into “Full Radex’”’ areas, and at Bikini Atoll they had accompanied 1965 persons on 427 missions. The main functions of the Monitors were to advise the party leaders of radiation intensities in the areas, the accumulated dosages of the party members, and the safe “time of stay” in the areas. In addition, the Monitors relayed radiation intensity information to the Rad-safety Operations Section, which was then plotted on the daily rad-safety situation maps. In addition to monitoring for H&N work parties, the Monitors were also call- ed upon to accompany personnel of other Task Groupsinto ‘Full Radex”areas. An innovation in the field of rad-safety monitoring was the use of underwater Monitors. Four Rad-safety personnel, checked for physi- cal fitness and swimmingability, were instructed in the use of the Aqua-Lung. These Monitors made underwater radiation surveys whenever H&N divers were required to do underwater work ' am me NR anaelitcam, mata 6 . ~ eremeanariai.. 4” RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY. a — The Rad-safety organization of TG 7.5, composed of AEC and H&N Rad-safety personnel, functioned separately from TU-6 of TG + ag Leen:“ , a onyeget * 7.1 and was designated TU-E.7. A close liaison was maintained on mutual rad-safety matters during the operational period betwen TU-6 of TG 7.1 and the H&EN Rad-safety Department. Work on common problems such as dosimetry, decontamination, and instrument repair was accomplished as a joint function. On 1 April 1958 the operational control of the Rad-safety facilities, operated during non-test periods by H&N, wasrelinquished to CTU-6, TG 7.1. » © tae - « ~~. (Neg. No. W-V-290-9) Figure No. 3-10. Vehicle Decontamination Pad — Nan. Page 369