Ne eel eT eeclairnityDeSine eo ne . CHAPTER 1 CONCLUSIONS 1.1 EPG logistics and the associated problems of funding, advance procurementof longlead-time items, and delay in the preparation of the performance of work on a “crash” basis and a marked increase in the total cost of the 1.2 -v le ee ee ee ee ee the definitive plans of construction resulted in ee oe ee PART IV, CHAPTERS 1 ond 2 program. The expanded scope of the operation to include Johnston Island contributed to a serious shortage of experienced security personnel within TG 7.5. 1.3 ’ The retention of responsibility for TG 7.5 radiological safety within 7.5 proved successful in protecting the interests of the AEC and should be continued during any future operation. 1.4 In view of the magnitude and successful completion of Operation HARDTACK, Phase I, it is concluded that all staff sections of TG 7.5 and H&N accomplished an outstanding job in the planning and execution of TG 7.5 operations. CHAPTER 2 , RECOMMENDATIONS The following recommendations are based on the concept that future operations at EPG will be comparable in scope to Operation RED- WING and HARDTACK,PhaseI: 2.1 The concept of testing in the Pacific has changed gradually over the past several years, and it appears that even greater changes may well be in prospect. Preliminary studies in- dicate_that an appreciable_reduction_could be madein_thepersonnelstrengthrequired to con- duct an operation the magnitude of HARDTACK, Phase I, under the revised concept of organization. Any appreciable reduction in personnel will dividual projects approved by competent authority cognizant of the current MODUS OPERANDI and based on probable future scopes of activity. Definitive p would be reviewed in a more orderly and realistic manner preliminary to an authorization for construction on a normaltime basis. 2.5 Future budget planning should provide for the bulk of permanent construction in the fiscal year preceding the operational period. This will result in a more economical and orderly ; construction program. Funds should be advanced for preliminary and fina] engineering of expendable test barracks, warehousing, etc. It is recommend facilities as soon as the basic needs become that a joint AEC-DOD review be made of the 7 known, even if a test series is not immediately test organization structure and of the AEC-DOD forseeable. Construction would be authorized agreement, with particular regard to distribution only after Scientific Users have demonstrated to of supportservices between the twoagencies. AEChigher authority that a specific device requires testing in the manner proposed. Many 2.2 Phasing of the use of EPG to one primary preliminary and final plans probably would be User (LASL, UCRL, or DOD) at any one wasted; however, the savings realized in “nontime would tend to reduce further the total mancrash” construction programs would more than power requirements and would result in stabilioffset added engineering costs due to discarded zation of the Contractors’ work force to a lower level. It is obvious that such a policy would not Pp. release drastically needed facilities, includin only reduce scientific personnel strength but would likewise reduce the strength of all supporting Task Groups. . 2.3. TG 7.5 should be assigned complete responsibility for all radiologi safety ». support services at EPG during interim and operational periods. 2.4 Funds for PAC construction should be authorized on the basis of an APPROVED projected 5-year long-range program, with in- 2.6 2.7 A substantial increase in investment in the Contractor’s current-use stores inventory should be authorized, in view of the fact that advance procurementof long-lead-time items is highly important to the orderly and economical consummation of a test program. Emphasis should be placed on building up the inventory of such items as coaxial cable, submarine cable, de- humidification units, generators, PI&S building sections, etc. |