developmentprojects geared to providing a variety of alternatives for meeting the Nation’s energy needs. As a result The Federal Court of Appeals’ August 4, 1971 landmark decision concerning the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant laboratories became involved in the areas of superconducting power transmission systems, energy storage, solar energy, geothermal resources, and coal gasification.(34) mission’s licensing procedures. The Court ruled that the the Commission’s industrial contractors and national Reorganization James R. Schlesinger took over the helm of the Atomic Energy Commission in August 1971, as its twenty-fifth year as an agency was drawing to a close. American troops were still in Vietnam and anti-war protests were widespread. The Nation faced increasing demands for energy, a leveling out of domestic oi! production, limitations on coal use due to environmental concerns, inadequate natural gas supplies, and field delays in the licensing and construction of nuclear power plants. The rapid growth in atomic energy activities in the previous decade and changing perspectives in nuclear technology clearly pointed to the need for a substantial reorganization of the Commission’s operational and regulatory functions. For nearly a quarter of a century the Commission had focused research and development toward responding to national defense requirements, funding and developing new uses for atomic anergy, and fostering the growth of a competitive and viable nuclear indusiry. The next few years would see increasing attacks on the Commission’s role as a regulatory overseerof the nuclear industry, particularly in the areas of quality of product and public safety.(35) Asa first order of business, Schlesinger led the Commis- sion in a comprehensive review of the agency’s functions and organization. An economist and former assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, Schlesinger announced the results of the review in December 1971. The first broad reorganizaton in ten years would bring together various related programs previously scattered throughout the agency. Developmental and operational functions formerly under the jurisdiction of the general manager would now be under six assistant general managers for Energy and Dev slopment Programs, Research, Production and Management of Nuclear Materials, Environment and Safety Programs, National Security, and Administration. Reflecting expanding areas of Commission involvement were new. divisions of Controlled Thermonuciear Research, International Security Affairs, and Applied Technology.(36} The second half of 1971 atso saw a major revamping of the regulatory organization and functions. Calvert Cliffs Decision The Nixon Administration believed that nuclear power, as an environmentally ‘‘clean” fuel, could help the Nation produce the increasing supply of energy needed for the future. On the other hand ponderous licensing procedures and increasing environmental considerations lengthened the time necessary to bring nuclear power plants online, and increased costs to the industry, and ultimately to the consumer. As Commissioner Doub informed the Atomic Industrial Forum in October 1971, the Commission harbored noillusions as to the magnitude of the task of trying to match “the capabilities of a dynamic and complex technology to the urgent energy and environmental needs of the country. '(37) became a pivot point for a major revamping of the Com- Atomic Energy Commission's regulations for implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969in licens- ing procedures did not comply in several respects with the Act, and that the Commission should make an independent review and evaluation of ail environmental effects at every decision point in the nuclear power plant licensing process. Moving swiftly to implement the Court's ruling, the Commission made substantive changes in environmental review procedures. Both the Commission and the license applicant would now be required to consider the total impact of the proposed plant on the environment, including water quality. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis would balance the benefits of building the facility against a variety of alternatives.(38) These changes in procedures affected virtually all nuclear power plants whetherlicensed for operation or under review. To expedite the additional procedures which the Calvert Cliff's decision required, Schlesinger made significant changes in the Commission's regulatory organization, and added additional personnetto the staff to help with the expanded reactorlicensing workload. Additionat changes tn 1972 further streamlined the regulatory staff. Three direc- tors consolidated the functions previously performed by seven divisions. All licensing activities were centered in the largest of the three, the Directorate of Licensing, headed by John F. O'Leary, former Director of the Bureau of Mines.(39) The Commission’s Last Days Schlesinger left the Atomic Energy Commission in January 1973 to become head of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was succeeded as chairman by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, a marine biologist from the state of Washington who had been appointed to the Commission by President Nixon in August 1972. The first woman to be chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Ray took over at a time when the Nation was faced with the monumental task of reconciling energy needs, environmental concerns and economic goals. More importantly for the Commission, criticism had begun to mount against an agency that regulated the very same energy source that it helped to produce and operate. In June 1973, President Nixon directed the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to undertake an immediate review of federal and private energy research and developmentactivities and to recommend an integrated program for the Nation.(40) The President's energy proposals to Congress the following January reflected the recommendations submitted by Chairman Ray in the December 1, 1973 report on ‘The Nation’s Energy Future.” Because of the energy crisis resulting from the October Arab oil embargo, the President had chosen to break tradition and present his energy request to Congress before delivering his State of the Union address. Both his proposal for a five-year $10 billion energy research and