feay? on the desired time scale are only three and that only the largest one would give the defense information required; that the rocket equipment is already in the Pacific in March of 58 and that any changes now would effect the satellite firing. Of particular note is the statement "even though he thought the Hardtack test series would be the last in the Pacific and he could appreciate the need for this vital defense information, the Chairman (Strauss) questioned the element of urgency, in as much as the commission had known nothing of this development six months ago.'' Starbird had extensive discussion with the Task Force during this short period of time of discussion and two messages in particular are noted on 26 March and 28 March from JTF7. Shot at another location. Further discussion addressed to alternative locations came in the 1 April Commission meeting which began with Starbird presenting the JTF 7 information on . . the advantages and disadvantages of using Wake, Midway, Christmas, and Johnston Islands. The commission members quickly focused on the possibility of Johnston Island and ''Strauss said he had visited JI and believed this would be a satisfactory location. He added that in view of the possibility of flash blindness for natives on atolls in the vicinity of Enewetok, you could not support holding the shot there. Mr. Libby | remarked that he also would favor Johnston Island."' ---Mr. Floberg inquired about the additional time required if the shots are to be moved to JI. General Starbird replicd that necessary construction work and the removal of personnel would require an additional 5 or 6 months. that this might be a conservative estimate of time required. He added During further discussion, the Commissionct referred to Mr. Strauss! carlier suggestion 64