RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
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Island
Local Name
_—
.
Code Name
Level of Pu
Concentration*
Remarks
Boken
IRENE
lsopleth J**
1, 2
Runit
YVONNE
Northern half, Pu
1, 2
Lujor
PEARL
Hot spot
1, 2
Bokuluo
Bokombako
ALICE
BELLE
SALLY
Aomon
burial grounds
Pu burial grounds
‘
1
2
2
Kirunu
Louj
Mijikadrek
Kidrinen
CLARA
DAISY
KATE
LUCY
2
2
2
2
Eleleron
RUBY
2
2
OLIVE
Agj
“Actions assumed for specific ranges of Pu concentration are tabulated as follows:
|
|
Level
———
|
1
2
|
|
'
Plutonium
Concentration
(pCi/g Soil}
Action
> 400
40<C <400
Soil removal by repetitive scraping
Individual case consideration
All other islands have Pu concentrations < 40 pCi/g and do not require cleanup action.
**TAB A, Volume II, NVO 140, Enewetak Radiological Survey.
FIGURE 2-4, ISLANDS REQUIRING PLUTONIUM CLEANUP PROCEDURES.
|
soil on this island.) Case 3 was preferred based on the premise that
safeguarding the Enewetak people from harmful radioactivity was of prime
importance, and it was uncertain that Case 4 or Case 5 actions would be
effective in reducing exposure potentials so that more of the northern
teas
Case 4: Same cleanup and disposal as Case 3 plus removal of 239,000
cubic yards ofsoil from Enjebi and replacement with imported soil, same
island use as Case 3 plus use of Enjebi for residence and some controlled
agriculture. This case was rejected because predicted doses from the
proposed use of Enjebi exceeded AECcriteria and because of the great
Planning and Programming
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89
uncertainty of maintaining the controls necessary to reach those reduced
doses.
Case 5: Same cleanup as Case 3 plus removal! of over 700,000 cubic
yards of soil from other tslands; disposal of contaminated debris and soil
by ocean dumping, replacement of soil from scraped areas with imported
soil: and use of all islands with no restrictions as indicated in the 1973
Master Plan. This case was rejected because of the uncertainty that it
would actually reduce exposures and because it was inordinately
expensive. !06
The preferred Case 3 combined Cleanup Action I! and Habitation Plan
C and permitted reasonable use of the entire atoll (Figure 2-5). Not all
reviewers agreed with the selection of Case 3 as the optimumcase or even
that it was an acceptable case. Some AECofficials argued strongly for the
cleanup of Enjebi and further study of the Runit cleanup problem. Mostof
those involved, however, believed that Case 3 provided a practical basis
for cleanup, rehabilitation, and resettlement.
LTG Johnson personally presented copies of the DEIS to the Enewetak
people and their attorney, Mr. T. R. Mitchell, at a high-level meeting on
Enewetak on 7 September 1974. Other attendees included: Mr. Stanley S.
Carpenter, Director, Office of Territorial Affairs, DOI; Mr. William Rowe,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA; Mr. Peter T. Coleman, Deputy
High Commissioner, TTPI, Messrs. Martin Biles, William W. Burr, Jr.,
and Mahlon E. Gates, of AEC; RADM Swanson, Brigadier General
Wesley E. Peel, USA, POD Engineer, Mr. Earl Gilmore, H&N; and Mr.
Amata Kabua, then Senator in the Congress of Micronesia and
subsequently President of the Marshall Islands. Representatives from the
Marshalls District Legislature and the Bikini Atoll Council also
participated. Motion pictures and illustrated briefings covering nuclear
testing, the Radiological Survey, the Engineering Survey, the Master Plan,
and the DEIS were presented in both English and Marshallese to the over
100 dri-Enewetak who attended.!97 The Government’s plans were
generally well received by the people; however, they had misgivings about
some aspects, particularly not being able to live on Enjebi, the plan for onatoll disposal of radiological contamination, and the possibility that Runit
might not be cleaned enoughto preclude the need for quarantine. !98 Upon
his return to Washington, LTG Johnson was forced to send the people
more discouraging news: Congress had again denied funds to begin
ola:
1
4
completed to permit a firm estimate of overall cost.!09.110
'
ine
During the conference, it had been agreed that some 50 dri-Enewetak,
including the Planning Council, should return to the atoll early and live on
Japtan during the cleanup project to consult and advise on cleanup and
rehabilitation problems. The early return was contingent on Congress