- ~
4.2.2
.
{Techniques
The techntqueseused are described in Chapter 2, Section 2.3,
4.2.3
Operations
Conditions on the Eninman and Rojoa complexes where most of the
UCRL diagnostic effort was located were very satisfactory before the shot
schedule commenced. These conditions were largely the result of having
L-Division personnel stationed at each complex to ensure that suffictent attention was paid to UCRL support requirements. Unfortunately, the Rojoa
complex was contaminated by the aEshot which required
f
hosed
that the camp be deactivated as a full scale installation, After a period of
daily commuting from Parry, a few tents were made livable and the diagnostic crews returned to the complex on a full time basis which reduced
the strain on meeting the UCRL Rojoa shot schedule.
4.2.4
Results
Results are given in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.
*4.2.5
a.
Recommendations
The policy of concentrating an individual laboratory’ s major efforts
on an island complex should be continued.
b. The staff function (L-Division) required on an island complex
should continue to be supplied by the Laboratory with the major effort in
the area.
ce. Reoccupation of a contaminated complex should be expedited if a
major portion of the program is yet to be accomplished, in order to minimize commuting. Many diagnostic procedures are best done at night, which
makes commuting a problem.
4.3.
TASK UNIT 3, DOD PROGRAMS
TU-3 was organized to conduct approved weapon effect tests under the
operational control of CTG 7.1 and the technical direction of AFSWP. The
organization included a TU headquarters at Eniwetok with a Forward Area
command at Bikini. The Bikini command was assigned a minimum number
of permanent personnel (four officers and three enlisted men) and was
- 141 -
>
|
/38