ee
attack on this country could not succeed in penetrating our defenses.
They expect that dur military de-
©
fenses will be so effective that no more than a few bombs would be droppedin targets in thip country in the
event of a massed aerial attack. These are not sophisticated views, but they are no legs: dangerous for
being naive. Furthermore, it is understandable that these are views that are easily grdsped and held;
they represent what people wish to believe.
Psychological studies as well as common experience show that people develop “blihd spots’? when
confronted with prospects that are, for one reason or another, intolerable to them. Foy example, some
ty denne gp
afm
protect them, In any event, only a very small proportion believes that there is a suffici¢ntly strong possibility of a successful attack to warrant their becoming involved in preparations such as|volunteering for
service in the Ground Observer Corps, taking some Civil Defense training, or even bdthering to learn
~
elementary matters of survival such as the meaning of the warningsignals.
Werealize that they have been told on many occasions, by high-ranking civilian and[military leaders,
that a near-perfect degree ofair defense is improbable, but they are much more receptive fto the occasional
statements that a particular ground-to-air missile offers virtually complete protection forfour cities or that
such-and-such an interceptor, with truly wonderful electronic equipment, will sweep the Bombers from the
skies comfortably far from our metropolitan centers. They believe these things becahse they wish to
Biweee
Gl
believe them.
,
There is another large segment of the population that accepts the possibility of a ccessful nuclear
attack on this country but rejects the notion that anything effective or significant can e done aboutit.
These people are reacting in a not uncommon mannerto the shock of contemplating a ightful propsect.
In actual disasters, such reactions take the form of a kind of dazed apathy; in anticip ion, they are reflected in a hopeless, frustrated, fatalistic feeling.
In the event of massive nuclear attack, without drastically improved preparation @f our people, we
might expect an initial shock reaction to the sight of more dead and injured than they wquld have believed
possible, to the inadequacy of medical supplies and rescue andfirefighting resources, and to the impossible
demands for help that the situation would place on the able-bodied survivors. TH initial reaction
would be followed by a number of other emotional states such as the following:
(1) An assortmentof fears—of radioactivity, of new attacks, of invasion, of loss of dbsent relatives, of
exposure to cold and starvation, of pillage, of strangers, etc.,
(2) Bereavement, complicated by strong feelings of personal guilt due to a deep-segted suspicion that
(3) Maladapted overactivity or apathy.
Wemight logically expect these emotional states to find expression in extensive fegative behavior.
Judging from experience in past disasters, this would probably take the form of hoarding, petty delinquency,
10
FOPSECRET
PEE Poa aseSarre aeraiindada
Co
.
nD gee at
“
yO
“ares
ebcet
ae,
ae
CeFp BEod sep,
sg?
the lives of dead relatives might have been spared if the survivors had made more Adequate prepardtions, and
-*
Pe
RA
Pa Pat
re
or
a
f
ne
on)
he
When people undergo experiences that are much more harrowing than they had e pected, a: predictable psychological result is the emergence of acute anxieties that find expression in hojtilities directed
toward constituted authorities. A well publicized example ofthis is to be found in the widespread hostility
directed toward Hermann Goering after the World War IL bombings of German cities.
Fe had led the
German people to believe that it could not happen to them.
Atpresent we are convinced that too large a segment of the American people believq that.a nuclear
cdl
a
information has ndt become kndwledge, and this, in our opinion,is the crux of the proble
-
people do not
a Oe el
A basic judgment that supports this estimate is the firm conviction that the American]
have nearly enough knowledge of the consequences of a successful nuclear attack. We recognize that
there have been.widely held and voiced opinions that necessary information has been withheld from them
on grounds of sécurity. Wehavesatisfied ourselves that sufficient information has been jnade available
to them—but tt “has not been successfully conveyed to them and incorporated in their feelings and acifons. Thus the
Ta te F
TORSEGREL,..