TOPSECRET:
Supplementary Considerations in Implementing the Program
The proposed program offers hope of involving the people of our Country in the mostcritical issges of
the times and of stimulating widespread understanding of basic problems of national security and
national harmony. Webelieve that when broad questions such as these are involved, the process @f involvement through group discussion is more effective than the mass communications media appr@ach,
although both have a contribution to make, and can be mutually reinforcing. (For example, sufveys
indicate that, as a result of efforts largely limited to mass media, 62% of the American people are ‘‘ayare”’
of the meaning androle of civil defense, but probably not more than 3% of the people are significantly
involved in it.)
Webelieve that such issues can be discussed in an atmosphere of calm deliberation with less emphasis
on the symbols and images of disaster that so often characterize the emergency approach to attehtion
getting, but which carries the danger of provoking apathy and hysteria. Nevertheless, we cannotfhope
to escape such adverse reactions altogether, and we must, therefore, be prepared to deal with a cqrtain
amountof hysterical reaction in the initial phases of the program.
We must, furthermore, recognizq that
we face the problem of possibly sustaining over a long period involvement in these issues and readinfss to
play a constructive role in a disaster situation. In general, it is reasonable to expect that response fo an
emergency appeal will be short-lived, in the event that the emergency does not occur. Furthermore,
excessive preoccupation in the presentation with “‘gory” details is likely to evoke the kind of apathetic
hopelessness and susceptibility to rumor referred to earler. On the other hand, failur2 to presenta redlistic
aimed andeffective.”
There is both an opportunity and a need to analyze, under controlled conditions, the actual
come that the Swiss have managed successfully for several centuries to maintain. While gross differences
in the situations of the United States and Switzerland immediately spring to mind, these differenqes do
not satisfactorily account for the individual psychological readiness of the Swiss to react purposefully
according to prepared plans whenever danger of war threatens the country.
Webelieve that there would be distinct advantages in achieving a vigorous partnership of gqvernmental and non-governmental leaders in launching and sustaining the program. If this effort to prepare
the psychological defense of the people against nuclear attack is to be successful, there must be independent
evidence that the Federal, State and local governments are preparing themselves—that they are taking
the world situation seriously. The progress of the civil defense program is likely to be taken as a] most
significant index of this.
This means that there needs to be evidence of sustained governmental action in the stockpiling of
food and medical supplies; the development of a system of radiological defense, including the proyision
of effective shielding of individuals from dangerous exposure; the developmentof plans for housing, flothing and feeding refugees; provision for the maintenance of law and order in a variety of contingencies,
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to evacuate; provision of training in the several branchesof civil defense operations; provisions for tbugh-
ening and elaborating our communications and transportation networks; and planning for and develbping
the capability of civil governmentatall levels to survive the initial blow. This latter effort should be
characterized by substantial support and strengthening ofthe resiliency of local and State government.
Oneofthe great historical advantages we enjoy is that of governmental decentralization. While it would
be of the utmost importance following an attack to reestablish centralized communication and ever con-
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missions of the highest priority; careful, well-rehearsed plans for the evacuation of cities when sufficient
warning of approaching attack allows; provision of adequate shelter for those who lack time or opporqunity
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including use of such State and federal military resources as are not immediately required for military