3. In a letter of June 13, 1952, circulated previously
as AEC 493/4, the Military Liaison Committee transmitted a Joint
Chiefs of Staff requirement for the development of thermonuclear
weapons which follows in part:
"a, A military requirement exists for the develop-
ment of thermonuclear weapons giving yields of one
megaton upward; a military requirement exists for the
production of such weapons provided they are compatible
in size, shape and weight with delivery systems that
will be available .in 1954,
"e, The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize
that prior production of a deliverable thermonuclear
weapon by the USSR would serve to reduce the present
U.S. preponderance in atomic weapons, and that such
a shift in balance might exert strong influence on
Soviet policy decisions,
This factor, when taken together with the promise of U.S. thermonuclear programs, is considered to provide adequate justification
for an approach which may represent considerable tech-
nical risk and large expenditure of funds."
4, Because of the urgency of the thermonuclear weapon
development as expressed in the above paragraph the reorientation
of the thermonuclear program must obviously be related to such
policy considerations as well as to technical considerations.
Since the production of a proven weapon involves full-scale test~
ing,
the date to be set for the CASTLE operation will be an in-
portant determinant of the scope and emphasis of the development
program and the time at which operational capability will be
realized.
this date.
There is need for the earliest possible decision on
This paper discusses the. main issues pertinent to
timing of Operation CASTLE on the basis that the finally approved
programs of LASL and UCRL will include projects indicated in
letters from Drs. Bradbury and York circulated in AEC 597/2, and
recommends a date for the test program which should satisfy the
technical requirements as well as the DOD requirements.
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