Security, and the FBI. The Classification Officer served with representatives of other Task Groups as a Classification board on those classification matters not solely within the purview of TG 132.1. The Classification Officer, using the experience gained in Operation Greenhouse and other continental and overseas tests, early in the program prepared an interim Classification Guide for approval by the AEC and issuance by the Task Force. As the nature of the tests became more specific, it was possible to make a more detailed Classification Guide. This was done and submitted to the Task Force for approval by the AEC andother authorities. Any guideis, of course, reliable as of the time of issuance but is subject to change with the occurrence of events. Furthermore, in making a guide it is impossible to anticipate every situation which may arise. Consequently, the Classification Officer and staff maintained contact with the oper- ating technical organizations, the AEC Washington headquarters, and the J-2 Section of the Joint Task Force so that decisions could be made to meet the situations as they developed prior to the overseas phase of the operation. The Classification Office moved to the Forward Area with the Task Force but left a rear-echelon group at Los Alamos. The Classification Office has a continuing load of photographic review and technical-report review for assignment of classification grading. Only one anomalous situation occurred during the over-all operation. It is generally agreed that the size, weight, and shape of a nuclear device are Restricted Data, but, in the case of the Mike device, it was not feasible to produce and transport the case on a Restricted Data basis within the time limit set, if ever. Furthermore, the Mike case was determined by the scientific authorities not to reveal information on the nature and operation of the Mike de- vice. Consequently, it was arranged that the components of the Mike case, when not identified as nuclear-device components, could be treated as Confidential Security Information, and the Classification Guide reflected this ruling that the size, weight, and shape of the Mike device would be Confidential Security Information. However, whenever the Mike device was illus- trated or photographed as a nuclear device, it was graded as Restricted Data. Later, on a directive from Washington, the Mike device was graded Restricted, not Security Information, in order to avoid the ridiculous situation which results from possible interpretation of the wording of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, in defining Restricted Data. The Classification Office at no time relied on this grading authority but considered all photographs of the assembly to be at least Confidential Restricted Data. After the completion of the operation, at the direction of the AEC, Washington, the grading of the size, weight, and shape of the Mike device was raised to Confidential Restricted Data, which conformsto the actual gradings applied to photographs of the assembly. However, component parts of the case, when not identified as nuclear-device components, are merely treated as accountable property and are given such protection. The component parts are, of course, kept in containers or otherwise separated so that the shape of a complete case is not apparent. The Classification Office maintained a uniform policy that no information relating to the operation would be considered totally unclassified unless it was approved for release by the AEC and DOD authorities. Sometimes this rigid rule worked some unpleasant delays in routine administration, but no alternative seemed apparent in view of the extreme concern expressed by the Washington authorities about any public statement relative to the operation. The Classification Officer can only comment parenthetically that some of the items treated as classi- fied could not reasonably be considered classified when viewed from the field of operations. Furthermore, it was necessary to use open radio circuits giving information which was con- sidered highly classified in the Washington headquarters. In addition, the unique procedures employed for the Mike Shot clearly revealed yields of extraordinary magnitude to thousands of personnel cleared for only low-order military information. These are matters of security, not of classification, but they are pertinent to the application of security gradings in an unrealistic manner becauseof the necessity to enforce directives by individuals not personally acquainted with the situation as it actually occurs. ™