I
7
o
“8
was to be determined upon the reception of definite information on the
number and types of participatingaircraft.
The use of Taongi Atoll as an additional firing site in the Eniwetok Proving Ground was contemplated in the early planning stages of HARD~
TACK,
Task Group 7.1 in Jamuary 1957 expressed a desire to have an ear
ly decision whether or not the additional atoll would be used. 2°
Many
operational vroblems were inherent in the use of Taongi, and of the great—
est importance to Task Group 7.4 was the necessity for extablishing control facilities for aircraft in the Taongi area.
Colonel Massey of Joint
Task Force SEVEN stated that the use of Taongi appeared to require a
policy decision from the Atomic Energy Commission and the State Depart—
ment,
Until a decision was provided, no definite planning to include
shots at Taongi could be completed.
By 1 May 1957, no decision on the Taongi issue had been reached,
although the University of California Radiation Laboratory was still
attempting to secure approval of the atoll as a shot site.
A memo on
l May stated:
‘Operational plans envision that all operations /{nvolving
Taonzi/ will be conducted from afloat. No personnel to
be stationed ashore, and no runway to be constructed.
Since Taongi lies 475 NM from "niwetok, 324 from Wake,
356 from Kwajalein, and 285 from Bikini, there should at
least be a strip prepared for real emergencies, This
recommendation is made even in light of the heavy con~
tamination Tuongi will surely zet.
Again, on 16 May 1957, 2 letter 12 from Joint Task Force SEVEN,
arene
Q?
AFWL/ HQ