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Papers, 1953-61i
(Ann Whitman file)
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Mr. McCone said we would not as far as these particular
devices are concerned, but expressed concern over setting a
precedent which might have great effect in the future, particularly as regards "PLOWSHARE". He said that we could not throw
additional tests open to inspection.
The Vice President took up the question of timing. He said
that the moment the offer was made, a debate would be on which
would become a political issue. He said that Senator Anderson
would put the offer into the campaign, as would Senator Lyndon
Johnson, probably taking the line that we were being naive with
the Soviets.
He said that Congressional opposition would indi-
cate that the President did not have support in Congress and
that the Joint Committee would never agree in a campaign year.
If the issue were debated before November 8, it would be distorted and could not be argued on its merits.
The President observed that if we do not have something
to keep the negotiations going along, then we are saying in
effect that we give up.
The Vice President voiced support for the President's
announced stand on no tests in the atmosphere, adding that we
know we can learn all we need from underground tests.
He said
that another disadvantage of setting a specific date was the
ultimatum aspect.
The President wondered if a date could not
be set subsequent to the election.
The Vice President said that
it would be desirable to leave the date in a more indefinite
status.
The more definite the date, he said, the more susceptible
the matter would be to political discussion.
Secretary Herter said that if a mid-November date were
selected, the scientists would have to occupy the test site a
month ahead and by their presence would reveal the timing.
Mr.
McCone agreed, and said that extensive preparations for the shot
would be necessary, including the moving in of scientists, who
would be identified by the press.
The Fresident suggested that
we would not have to fix an exact date but that we might say "on
or after”.
Secretary Gates suggested that we might re-affirm our
position after talking to Prime Minister Macmillan. We could
tell the Soviets that we want them to answer again.
Secretary Herter raised the question of how far off the
decision could be put from the point of view of planning.
At
some time we have got to establish a cut-off date.
The President
suggested that we might say to the Soviets, "If you do not agree,
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