effective control system with an organization capable of applying them @ffectively.
Since the U.S. has not yet shipped sizeable quantities of enriched mate! rial to any
one country and no inspection activities have been carried out under JU. >. bilaterals,
the practical operating problems of implementing the safeguards provisipns of U.S.
bilaterals have yet to be resolved.
It is also not yet clear whether i | will be
feasible for countries with important atomic energy programs to remain butside a
world safeguard system.
India appears determined to avoid safeguards a nd the
Soviet Union appears to be endeavoring to tie the satellites to it withbut any
formal bilateral controls of its own or without involving the Soviet Or' pit in the
IAEA inspection system.
Continued positive efforts by the U.S. in the | LARA,
together with comtimed effort to increase world-wide appreciation of t! he importance of the control problem, will be required to achieve U.S. objectiv 5.
It should be noted that this NSC objective is formulated solely in terms
of diversion of "fissionable materials provided to other countries.®
A nh equally
if not more important element of the control problem now appears to be insuring
against diversion of the fissionable material woduced as a result of | phe
4
Sj
LeU
(4)
3)
NSC 5507/2
(IN) 1
e
49)
materials and equipment transferred to the other country.
Part ITI
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