’ — (3) Many of the accepted procedures or modern American medical practice seemed strange to the Japanese, and their concepts are strange to Us. For example, access to patients by any physicians was denied for several days because the Japanese physicians found their patients to be in a Righly excited state and preferred not to disturb then. Japanese physicians indicated on several occassions that the taking of dup- licate blood smears by Japanese and american investigators was an unnessary duplication, and an ordeal that the patients should not be expected to undergo. In my initial conference with the Japanese scientists I was forced to the conclusion that they were not well equipped to deal properly with the rediclogical aspects of the problem. For example: (1) Some of the top scientists took the position that because a naw Kind of bomb was involved, the problem itself was «4 new one, and that unless they know all about the bomb, they could evaluate neither the injury to the fishermen nor the aspect of long-range contamination of Japan and its fishing crews throughout the Pacific. (2) The were quick to identify qualitatively some of the radioactive isotopes in the ash and immediately concluded that deposition of these radiowisotopes in the tissues of the men was the prime factor in their medical status. This decision was reached without benefit of radio-chemical urine analyses of the patients. This procedure which was beyond the capa~ bility of their laboratories is of course a prerequisite to understanding the amount and kind of fission product absorption that actually occured. (3) The University of Tokyo group administered parentally a massive dose of ash to one mouse, and following sacrifice 12 hours later, determined by radiography that radioactivity was present in the mouse skeleton. The activity of the dose was not measured. The fact that the redioactivity was detected by the scientists in the skeleton of the mouse was widely publi- ized as evidence for their conclusion that the patients were carrying dengerous internal deposits of radicactive isotopes. AS individuals, the scientists seemed anxious to cooperate. In oy initial conversations with them they freely asked for help and seemed gratified at some of the things that we could do for them. Uy participation on the American team was limited to the radiological aspects of the case and only incidentally to the patients themselves. Unfortunately the nature of Dr. Morton's participation required that he be given direct access :2 =ne patients and this the Japanese consistently refused to grant. As the days went by and the Japanese became more resolute in their decision to demy access to the patients, other areas of the problem became infacted by tre uncooperative atmosphere. portions of the report. This will cecomm apparent in subsequent OFE“RS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE When I arrived in Tokyo on Uarch 22 Dr. Morton had already offered to the Japanese the full facilities of the Atomic Bomb Casuality Commission. General Hull had likewise offered the facilities of the Far East Command. These offers were accompanied by a spirit of sympathy and the desire to assist the Japanese investigators in their efforts to evaluate the incident and to restore the health of the fishermen. 4 6&4 #t a meeting with *-°> .