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Limitations to Evacuation Movement
As pointed out previously in this paper, shelter of all kinds diminishes rapidly as one
moves outward from the center of the city. Shelter is imperative due to dangers from
immediate blast and thermaleffects, fallout radiation, and debris of all kinds from defender
action. In the Washington target 8 radial miles seems to be the limit of adequate shelter.
In addition to shelter, the public air-raid alert system that could warn evacuees to take
shelter is rapidly outrun.
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Fig. 11 — Barriers to Distant Evacuations Created by Terrain and Adjacent
Targets along the Eastern Seaboard
A third factor limiting evacuation is the presence of physical barriers, such as coasts
and mountains and the proximity of other targets. Figure 11 indicates evd@cuation limitations for 25 critical target areas along the Eastern Seaboard.” The solid lines indicate the
point halfway between one target and the next adjacent target, or the point at which an
evacuee from one city would be in equal jeopardy from a weapon aimed at an adjacent
city. This device would not be useful for planning purposes, since it assumes equal value
for targets and weaponsof equallethality, but it does serve to indicate that the targets
24
ORO—R-17 (App B)
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