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radiauion levels are still high there.
government-funded Brookhaven
Brookhaven researchers assess U.S.
government data. . . . The history of
the U.S. testing program was one of
repeated mistakes and miscalculations." In his view, ‘‘nongovernment radiation experts’
should be included in all such surveys.
A May 1979 General Accounting
millions of dollars have been spent
on building houses and community
facilities
and
on
replanting
thousands of coconut trees in the
southern islands: but no funds have
been trsed to rehabilitate the northem islands. This has caused prob-
questioned. Dr. Rosalie Bertell. a
consultant to the Division of Standard Setting for the Nuclear Regu-
cause of uncertainty of the long term
effects of exposure to lowlevel radiation, it 1s possible that the people of
study:
cess of current standards.’ It also
already moved back to the southern
islands, which the Agency calls
‘‘relatively
uncontaminated.”’
Meanwhile, the Department of En-
ergy says the atoll’s northern
islands—where the majonty of the
43 nuclear tests occurred—should be
off limits for at least 30 years. since
Because of the Departmentruling.
lems among the Enewetak people as.
traditionally, they are divided into
two distinct groups: the Dri-Enjebi in
the northern and Dri-Enewetak in
the south. Accustomed to their own
chiefs and land, the Dri-Enjebi are
reluctant to live on another chief's
land.
In September 1979, the radiological information about Enewetak was
presented by the Department of En-
The Enewetak people have an intense desire to return home, after 33
years on tiny Ujelang Atoll. And on
the basis of this information. the
——
.
~
Enyebi people voted to retum to their
island in the north. But the objectiv-
ity of the study conducted by Bender
and
Brill,
whose
base
is
the
National Laboratory, has been
latory Commission, said of the
‘The population of Enewetak has
the right to know that a value judg-
ment has been made for them,
namely that induction of canceris
their only concem. They may, if informed about hypothyroidism. aplastic anemia. premature aging, benign tumors and other such dis-
orders, make a different judgment.
They ‘reduced’ the radiation dose
of the inhabitants of Enjebi by av-
eraging in the population less ex-
~
posed. This is like telling one
ergy to the people. Michael Bender rnember of a family his or her risk of
. and Bertrand Brill, two scientists lung cancer is lowered if the other
hired by Micronesian Legal Services ronsmoking membersof the family
then testified that their study showed are included and an ‘average’ risk
all the islands to be safe for habita- Liven. [tis a scientifically ndiculous
tion, including northern Enjebi Is- approach to public health.
land. The chances of adverse effects
Basing a resettlement deciston afwere so small. they had concluded, fecting the fives of 500 people on the
that “cancer mortality tn the lifetime Bender and Brill inadequate health
of the population is estimated to be assessment would be extremely imless than a single case.""* They usserted that the Department of Energy overstated the risk: "DOE tends
to exaggerate the problem,”’ said Mic-
ronesian Legal Service Director Ted
Mitchell.®
prudent.””’
Glen Alcalay, a former Peace
Corps Volunteer in the Marshalls,
said the problem is “the inherent
conflict of interest in having
December 1980
Office report cautioned that “‘be-
Enewetak could receive doses im ex-
urged an independent assessment of
Enewetak by “‘experts who have no
direct connections with the nuclear
testing program or the Enewetak
cleanup project ... before resettle-
ment of the people begins.’’* This
report was initially withheld from the
Marshall Islands government for
political reasons.
Since deporting an independent
team of Japanese scientists invited
by Marshall Islands leaders to tn-
vestigate the radiation problems in
1971, the United States has steadfastly refused to allow independent
monitoring of the Marshallese
people and their environment.
President Lyndon Johnson an-
nounced in 1968 that Bikini—site of
23 bomb tests—would be returned to
its people. who had been living in
exile since 1946.
In 1969. the Atomic Energy Com-
mission said: “*({there is} virtually no
radiation left on Bikini’’ and “‘the
exposures to radiation of the Bikini
people duo not .offer a significant
threat to their health and safety.7'!
A small-scale cleanup and re-
habilitauion program was begun and
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 25