As has been indicated, complete roll-up after IVY had not been feasible or desirable. Following the publication of CJIF 132 op- Order 3-52 between MIKE and KING shots, a progressive redeployment and disposition of forces was initiated and ultinately those military personnel and that military equipment scheduled to remain at Eniwetok were consolidated under the control of the Army Task Group Commander. Civilian personnel and equipment were controlled by the AEC and its contractor, HEN , Because of the rapid developments occurring in the military aspects of atomic energy, the concept of Operation CASTLE was to be altered many times before the actual tests. Many of the changes in concept occurred during the early period under discussion, both immediately before and after the IVY detonations. Though CASTLE had been pianned for the Fall of 1953, perhaps as early as September, it was evident by January, 1953, that the operation would be delayed by as much as six months. Some of the reasons working toward this pos- sible delay were changes in design criteria for the CASTLE weapons and devices; changes in the scheduled availability of certain materials necessary for use in the weapons and devices; and the poten- tial conflict, personnel-wise, with tests which were then scheduled for Nevada during the Fall of 1952. Early thinking had indicated three shots for CASTLE, possibly four--with the fourth being a device utilizing a new principle which was under development at UCRL. Early in October, 1952, a CASTLE conference was held on Parry Islan¢ at which time Brigadier 10