3. retain the IVY Headquarters and Task Group staffs in being for the planning and execution of CASTLE, 4. designate for CASTLE the ships and aircraft which were al- ready activated and modified for IVY, 5. retain in the forward area appropriate troops and equipment for the short garrison phase, and, 6. return critical personnel and equipment to home stations and custody with a proviso that they be earmarked for CASTLE, As a result of these JCS decisions great economy in personnel and materiel accrued to the DOD and the initial firm planning of CASTLE was accomplished with a minimum of interruption in IVY progress. As a consequence, the period between June and November, 1952, witnessed few additional major decisions with regard to CASTLE, and IVY roll-up was planned in detail and executed with the best interests of CASTLE in mind. The transition between the two was unusually smooth. During the summer months prior to movement of the JIF 132 Headquarters to Eniwetok for IVY operations, studies were initiated in order to determine more specifically the nature of military support required for CASTLE, By early August this effort had resulted in the cosolidation of findings and the publication of a paper entitled, Report by CJIF 132 to the JCS on Armed Forces Participation in the 1953 Experimental Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests at Eniwetok - Bikini, Though the complete approval of this paper by the JCS was not feasible until such time as more precise information on the scientific