that time the salient elements of the thinking which seemed to necessitate early and broad consideration of the problem were as follows: 1. Theadvisability of utilizing for CASTLE the ships, air craft, and much of the equipment used during IVY which, in turn, would mean saving considerable amounts of effort and money. 2. The early designation of a CASTLE task force commander in order that he could familiarize himself with the problems and processes of IVY roll-up and the relation of these to the planning and mounting of the CASTLE operation. 3. The need for a briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) so that directives could be promulgated to insure efficient and economical transition from the current Task Force to its successor. The Pentagon briefing emphasized the importance of the earliest possible action on behalf of broad CASTLE planning. Because the time anticipated at that date to exist between IVY and CASTLE was relatively short, it was important in every sense to begin the planning of Operation CASTLE several months before the completion of IVY, The interim period was to be long enough to demand Task Force rede- ployment but not long enough to allow complete roll-up as had been characteristic of previous operations, This condition was to make CASTLE preparations unique when compared with those of preceding operations.