and TG 7.5 activities.
The contractor, H&N, was greatly affected by the shift aflcat
at Bikini and had to readjust to néw procedures.
This meant that
further work at Bikini had to be accomplished at a great disadvan~
tage and with fewer personnel,
It meant, too, that facilities at
Eniwetok would be grossly overtaxed until the Bikini personnel could
either be returned to the ZI or be quartered aboard ship.
And the
subsequent overcrowding afloat meant that H&N had to provide persomnel to supplement the Naval personnel for messing and other
activities,
In an operational sense, the on-site phase varied in many
respects from what had been indicated by CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan
No. 3-53.
Following the 1 March shot, much greater flexibility
had to be introduced into the plan in order that every effort could
be made to conclude the Operation somewhere near the criginally
scheduied ccmpletion date.
The various operations planners for the
Task Force had to maintain a constant and accurate appraisal of the
situation as affected by every exigency so as to accomplish all aspects of the overall CASTLE mission.
Prior to the first shot, there
were few operational problems which were not cf a plamning or preparatory nature.
Following 1 March, however. many :nnovations had
to be brought into play.
What proved to be an important planning step during the preshot phase was the attention given to the routine establishment
of an evacuation procedure.
Evacuation conferences, under the
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