WN)
Brig. General Alfred D. Starbdird
-2-
to fire on what might be referred to as abnormal conditions,
d.e., with some appreciable wind components from the south.
It might be said that we could fire at Taongi under more stable
weather conditions and more positive predictable weather eon-
@itions. In addition to its superior position with respect to
prevailing winds, the increased distances to populated isianis
are a distinct advantage from the safety aspect for two reasons.
First, in case of fallout on any populated areas, the levels
will be lower; and second, there will be appreciably more tine
to take emergency action. The comparable distances for Bikini
end Taonzi are:
Enivetok
Rongelap
Utirik
Bikini
Teongt
190
475
89
260
310
230
We believe there are game
raise further operational
Laboratories finishes its
rescheduling and possibly
features of the UCRL proposal that
questions. For example, one of the
shots and recovery then they contemplate
relocation vithin Enivetok, Bikini, or
Taongi to the best over-all advantage and diminishing of overall time. Therefore, flexibility im scheduling should be maintained.
We consider the UCRL estimate of time for HARDTACK being equal
to REDWIIG as being overly optimistic. A detonation schedule,
even using Taongi, averaging less than three days per shot is
questionable. Also, their estimate of damage to result from a
25 - 40 MT shot is open to question.
Past experience leads to
the conclusion that damage estimates have been both over and under
in the results.
We believe that the HARDTACK support requirement of Task Group 7.5
and other Task Force elements will asount to a 25% or 35% increase
over REDWING. This is based an a 3)-shot series for HARDTACK vs.
@ l7-shot series for REDWING. Eowever, it is agreed that there
will be some offsetting advantages to increased 1% 7.5 support
requirenents for Taongi as a result of decreased evacuation demands
at Bikini.
(contimmed)
COPi
i La ED/DOE
WL RG -
a.