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5.8 Hazards Associated with Breaching of the Containment Structure

‘As discussed above, radioactive material can escape from the con-

“tainment structure either by leaching, in which case all the radioactivity would be waterborne, or by actual breaching of the dome

structure, in which case the radioactivity would be both waterborne and

airborne.

If part of the dome were torn away, transport of the radio-

active material, now aggregated for the most part into larger particles

by the cementing process, most likely would occur during heavy storms,
and the most credible result would be that the wet and heavy contents

would be swept into the lagoon.

‘The whole area would be drenched and,

‘ hence, any material that had become airborne would be washed out
rapidly.
It is noteworthy that throughout the cleanup effort field

workers wore air filters for protection against airborne plutonium.

Radioactivity on all but a handful of filters was too low to be
detected in totally dry conditions. Thus, even during the most adverse

‘possible conditions (i.e., during the scraping, transporting, and

dumping of the contaminated soil), the amount of airborne plutonium was
negligible.
Zatimates of the potential future radiological dose at Enewetak due
to atmospheric resuspension of transuranics have been made by Robison

and co-workers (1980) based on resuspension experiments conducted at
Fnewetak and Bikini. These measurements included both the contribu-

tions of sea spray and suspended aerosols of terrestrial origin (the
"normal or background" mass loading at both locations was approximately
55ug/m of which about 60 percent was due to sea salt); they also

included high activity situations such as the cultivation of open
fields.” Dose rates were calculated assuming & hours per day of
high activity work. For surface soil transuranic concentrations equal
to those at Enjebi (which averages approximately 20 pCi/g), the
potential dose rate due to the inhalation pathway is estimated as 12
mrem/yr (Robison et al. 1980}. This would certainly overestimate the
dose rate to a visitor to Runit even if large quantities of unconsolidated material were to erode from the dome.

Thus, if the “off limits”

ban on the island were violated, potential health effects from such
resuspension appear unimportant.
.

With respect to the future of the containment structure, the
committee believes that the structure will maintain its physical

integrity for a long period of time (probably in the range of 10 to
10° years). However, it is impossible to estimate this with any

degree of certainty because the principal threat comes from the longterm cumulative effects of large storms.
If the key-wall eventually
were to be breached, the most likely outcome would be an erosion of
unconsolidated material out of the dome to the lagoon and reef, with
the dome subsiding upon the consolidated material. This would not
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1

"Based on measurements made near Windscale there is some evidence

that plutonium may be concentrated in the sea surface and subsequently
injected into the atmosphere by sea spray and transported by the wind
(Cambray and Eakins 1980). Any such concentration effect, if it does

exist, would be included in the measurements reported by Robison and
co-workers.

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