28 primary consumers) were found to be 0.57 + 0.61 and 0.15 +0.16 pci/kg (Considerably higher values are measured in the (wet), respectively. stomach contents, the viscera, and the liver.) In order to put such concentrations into perspective it should be noted that a daily consumption of as much as 1 kg of fish could exceed the current International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommended limit for plutonium ingestion only if the fish had a plu- tonium concentration of 10,000 pCi/kg (Penreath 1980). Robison and co-workers (1980) have made a detailed study of the potential radiological doses for Enewetak residents. Their estimates for the potential doses from marine foods are based on Noshkin'’s work, discussed earlier, and on a diet survey conducted when the Enewetak people were on Ujelang. They estimate that the mean daily intake of transuranics from seafood for an adult female will be 0.50 pci of zeer2845y and 0.12 pci #*4Am. According to their dose assessment model, this results in an estimated bone marrow dose cf 0.26 mrem/year, which is approximately 1 percent of the annual dose from the cosmic radiation in the Marshall Islands. 5.6 Dome Breachment — . A number of possible failure modes might result in breaching of the dome including storm wave and typhoon activity, foundation settling, long-term weathering, shrinkage cracking, earthquakes and tsunamis, volcanic activity, generation of methane gas from the organic debris, and human-related activities such as vandalism. Each of these failure modes was considered, but only the first two, storm wave and typhoon activity and foundation settling appear plausible to the committee. Probably the greatest hazard to the dome structure as well as to the people living on Enewetak Atoll will come from typhoons, which sometimes completely inundate these low islands. Although the dome was designed to withstand severe storm wave and typhoon activity, the . typhoons in this part of the world are so severe that a series of them conceivably could cause breachment of the dome structure. The mole, ° which surrounds the deme on the north and northeast sides,serves as the first defense for waves from that direction. If the mole failed (and was not repaired), the next typhoon could attack the key-wall of the containment structure, probably causing scour on the reef side. This attack would be minimized because the heavier riprap in the mole in all likelihood would be deposited on or in front of the ring wall. The ring wall sections (12 feet by 2 feet by 3.5 to 5 feet) each weigh more than 6 tons, much heavier than are required to resist wave action, and would therefore function as large riprap. Should the ring wall be washed out, a most unlikely event, wave energy would be absorbed by wave run-up on the dome, which would act like a beach in absorbing wave energy. However, the dome panels, each weighing more than 30 tons, also would act as riprap highly unlikely to be moved by wave action. It was mentioned in section 3.8 that Cactus Crater might have been partly formed in a man-made extension to Runit Island, and, if so, the containment structure could be vulnerable to erosion on the lagoon side should the beach ever retreat to the edge of the dome. However, on the we tol t TY > Cc csi basis of a recent study of aerial photographs of Runit, Ristvet believes that the 1981 shoreline, which is about 75 feet from the edge