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urgently to make an economic, psychological, and political survey
of what could and should be done. In this context, perhans the
advent of SPUTNIK had been helpful. The President added chat we
certainly did not wish to appear frightened and he had received
information today indicating that fear had pervaded the population
of the United States. The President believed that we could correct
this situation. The problem was whether we could correct the
tendency of every American to try to get the maximum for himself
out of the operation of our free economy. If we are going to have
to use controls on the economy, we had better impose them promptly.
General Cutler then suggested that the Council hear from Mr.
McCloy, likewise a member of the Advisory Panel. Mr. McCloy stated
that although the figures presented in Mr. Webster's presentation
were indeed impressive, particularly in terms of the human lives
which might be saved by a fall-out shelter program, he still had
some reservations with respect to the usefulness of the shelter program. With respect to the question of the imposition of controls on
the economy, Mr. McCloy doubted that further controls would be needed
in order to carry out the improvement of SAC and our air defense
capabilities along the lines recommended by the Panel. With respect
to the shelter program (which presumably in Mr. McCloy's opinion
might involve the necessity for controls), he suggested that he would
like to think further about this matter before reaching a decision.
He also pointed out that he had himself not personally been to the
Headquarters of the Strategic Air Cammand and accordingly he was
obliged to take the word of others who had been as to the vulnerability
of SAC. However, if SAC were in fact vulnerable, it must certainly
be made invulnerable. It was also Mr. McCloy's impression that shortcomings in the process of decision-making and inter-service rivalries
were acting as a brake on the progress of our defense effort. Whether
or not this was actually the case, the American public certainly believed it to be.
“0
In conclusion Mr. McCloy pointed out that even if the Administration carried out all the defense recommendations proposed by the
Security Resources Panel, the United States would still find itself
in a situation of instability from the point of view of the political
and foreign policy sides of the problem. Military defense was not
the sole answer to our problem. Our present situation called for an
imaginative domestic political program and an imaginative foreign
policy.
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY
The President indicated his inclination to agree with Mr.McCloy's
comments on inter-service rivalries and the decision-making process
in the Department of Defense. He then referred to the great difficulties which he was encountering in preparation for his speech over
television this evening. There were so many details to be considered
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