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such a degree that the Soviets will be unwilling to start a war.
This capability we must preserve at ell costs. With such a deterrent capability, together with the resources needed to wage the
cold war, we would be in a position to conduct our foreign policy
in such eo manner as to assure victory in the cold war.
The President commented that if those present were 4 group
sitting in the Kremlin, we would probably adopt the recommendations
and program of the Security Resources Panel in toto, regardless of
the effect of such action on our people. As it was, however, we
could not do this. We have before us a big job of molding public
opinion as well as of avoiding extremes. We must get the American
public to understand that we are confronting a tough problem but
one that we can lick. The President concluded by pointing out that
as consideration of the Panel's report proceeded, we would want to
be talking again with the members of the Panel who had drawn up this
report.
Thereafter General Cutler outlined in a general way what he
thought would be suitable Council action with respect to the Panel's
report.
At the conclusion of the meeting the President said he believed
it would be interesting to make a test to find out how long the mat-
ters which had come before the Council this morning could be kept
secret.
He also said that he could not thank the Security Resources
Panel and ite Advisory group enough for the marvelous piece of work
they had done.
General Cutler then requested the Statutory Members of the
, National Security Council and certain others, including Messrs .Sprague
and Foster, to join the Fresident in his office for a brief time.
(See Attached for List of those attending this meeting).
my Wearne
S. EVERETT GLEASON
Deputy Executive Secretary
teek ee HE
classified information which he had received from Headquarters,Strategic
Air Command on the following subjecte:
(1) The relatively small number of SAC planes which (on a recent
date when SAC was not in one of its various states of Alert)
could have taken off on an attack strike within the probable
tactical warning time. Mr. Sprague said that SAC, since the
date in question, had made improvements in the mumber of planes
which could take off but that this was a vulnerability which
needed to be corrected urgently.
Shae
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REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY
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At the meeting in the President's office, after the regular meeting
of the National Security Council, Mr. Sprague presented orally highly
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