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to political, psychological and economic factors which are certainly
not of equal importance to the United States and the USSR. While
broadly speaking these factors are outside the area of direct military
responsibility, they have a distinct and important bearing on the total
Free World military posture. The problems of world wide dispersion
of nuclear weapons for potential use by and support of friendly forces
and the occupation of foreign bases by U.S. forces possessing a
nuclear weapon capability affect not only quantitative requirements
but also design features maximizing safety in handling and simplicity
It is in the light of the above considerations that I find myself in
general agreement with the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in
its overall long range effects a test cessation will operate to the
distinct disadvantage of the United States.
If such a test cessation
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of delivery and/or reliance on larger quantities,
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For example: The Soviets! assumed inability by reason of a test
suspension to achieve an ICBM warhead of yield equivalent to ours
does not deny them the capability of an equally effective ICBM system
. through the development of larger payload capacity, improved accuracy
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delivery systems, maintaining larger forces or by other means.
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As regards the inability or time lag attributed to the Soviets in
achieving a position equivalent to or approaching that of the United
States, it should be obvious that as long as quantitative aspects of
nuclear weapons and both quantitative and qualitative aspects of other
weapons and delivery systems remain uncontrolled, efforts will be
made by both sides to compensate for failures to attain practicable
and desirable objectives in nuclear weapons designs by improving
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block it from further tactical weapon developments of the type indi-
cated by (c) and (d) above.
.
United States to enter into a test cessation agreement which would
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On a broader basis, concepts developed in the
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of maintenance,
interests of political solidarity of the Free World which would place
restrictions or restraints on the use of nuclear weapons by reason of
geographical, psychological or moral considerations, may require the
conduct of nuclear operations under conditions which the Department
of Defense could not meet without the further developments indicated
above. While the Department of Defense does not necessarily indorse
limited war concepts which would place restraints on the types of
nuclear weapons which may be used and the targets which may be
attacked, it is my view that it would be a serious disadvantagefor the
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