Sonetrenrit” led the teams of Japanese investigators into Hiroshima and ~ Nagasaki only to have his work interrupted by the Occupation investigators who undertook their own studies. Dr. Tsuzuki © seemed to accept my assurances that in the present situation, it was the intent of the American scientists to assist the Japanese and that all of our findings would be avallabe to them and could be used as they saw fit in their own publications, Dr. Tsuzuki was outwardly friendly to both Dr, Morton ‘and myself until the time of his departure for Geneva on March 31. Despite this, the lack of cooperation continued to be manifest on the part of the Japanese investigators, I do not know whether this was because we misjudged Dr. Tsuzuki's friendliness, or because he lacked influence on his Japanese colleagues, . (2) There was much evidence of rivalry among various Japanese medical groups. In particular, the staff at Tokyo - University, headed by Dr, Tsuzuki, were initially at odds with the group at the National Institute of Health, headed by Dr. Kobayashi, Moreover, the local physicians at Yaizu, where all but two of the patients were hospitalized until March 29, were anxious for various reasons that the patients remain there, Their lack of cooperation with the American scientists may have been motivated by their knowledge that the Americans advised . that the patients be transfered to Tokyo« . (3) Many of the accepted procedures of modern American medical practice seemed strange to the Japanese, and their concepts are strange to us. For example, access to patients by -. any physicians was denied for several days because the Japanese physicians found their patients to be in a highly excited state and preferred not to disturb them. Japanese physicians indicated on several occasions that the taking of duplicate blood smears by Japanese and American investigators was an unneces-~ sary duplication, and an ordeal that the patients should not be expected to undergo, In my initial conference with the Japanese scientists I was forced to the conclusion that they were not well equipped ‘to deal properly with the radiological aspects of the problem. For example; (1) Some of the top scientists took the position that be- cause a new kind of bomb was involved, the problem itself was a new one, and that unless they knew all about the bomb, they could evaluate neither the injury to the fishermen nor the aspect of long-range contamination of Japan and its fishing crews throughcut the Facific. (2) They were quick to Laentify qualitatively some of the radicactive isotopes in the ash and immediately concluded that Geposition of these radioisotopes in the tissues of the men’was the prime factor in their medical status, This decision was reached without benefit of radiochemical urine énalyses of the patients. This procedure wnich was beyond the capability of their laboratories is of course a prerequisite to understanding the amount and kind of fission product absorption that actually occurred, -3-