on Parry Island. TG 7.3 personnel remained afloat. A considerable amount of effort was required of the Contractor in order to properly feed, clothe, and house this sudden population influx at Parry. Recreation centers and beach buildings were converted into emergency housing; mess hall sched- ules were changed and Post Exchange operations enlarged to permit re- plenishment of lost or abandoned personal articles. It is the opinion of the SFOO that in successfully overcoming the many unforseen demands placed upon his organization, the Contractor exercised a commendable degree of foresight, ability and good judgement. The geographical relation of evacuated atolls with Bikini and Kwajalein is depicted in Figure 1. CHAPTER 2.1 2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS COMMENTARY As previously indicated in paragraph 1.4, the managerial functions for, off-continent test operations prior to Operation CASTLE were performed by the AEC in the capacity of a Task Unit within the Scientific Task Group of the Task Force organization. As may be surmised, it was not possible from such a subordinate level for the AEC to exercise the prerogatives to which it was entitled as the employer of the LASL and principal financial contributor to the cost of test operations. Being firmly convinced that broader AEC participation in the actual conduct of overseas test operations would aid materially in the planning and execution of support activities, the Santa Fe Op- erations Office recommended that the Task Force be augmented by a Base Facilities Task Group for Operation CASTLE. The recommendation was approved and, based on CASTLE experience, it is the opinion of the SFOO that this arrangement was superior to the previous organization. The long-range communication facilities at Eniwetok Island were seriously hampered by overcrowding, resulting in interference from motors, arc welders, aircraft operation, and interference between transmit and receive signals due to lack of physical separation of the equipment. Present plans for improving communications includes separation of the transmit and receive facilities by moving the transmitters to some other island within the atoll, moving of receivers to the present transmitter site, and installation of microwave or an equal to interconnect transmitters and receivers. If the separate island concept is adopted, it is planned to allow for transmissions from Eniwetok Island during interim periods and activation of the principal transmitter site during operational phases only. This plan is both feasible and desirable due to the limited number of operating circuits during interim periods and the substantial reduction in support requirements which would result therefrom as compared to operating a transmitter on a separate island on a year-around basis. Improved communications between Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls during afloat operations is highly important. The USS ESTES was extremely overcrowded from a communications standpoint and interference was the rule rather than the exception. 15