movement of the arming team.
In addition, many of the early events which
had heavy participation by the scientific projects required operational letters
outlining the scientific frequency alfocatfon and the plan for the movement
and positioning of the device from the weapon compound to the zero site area.
It was originally intended that the calculations for blast and thermal
effects would be performed by a staff section of JTF 7 (the Fallout Predic-
tion Unit). However, it did not arrive {n the area until around April 10, and
it became operational several days after that date. In view of the early
planned ready dates for some of the shots, it was necessary that computa-
tions be performed for Teak, Orange, and other events.
These were per-
formed by the J-3 Section. After FOPU became operational, assistance in
determining blast and thermal data for several shots was provided the J-3
Section, but for the most part it was a case of verification of the compilation of predictions. In future operations it would be well to define clearly
who or what agency is responsible for the calculating of predictions. If it
is to be the J-3 Section, assurance must be had that a qualified atomic
weapon staff officer be included in the section.
‘
Operations at Johnston Island differed from those at Eniwetok and
Bikini in that Task Force headquarters assumed more detailed control of
all facets of the operation. Although this phase of the operation was suc-
cessful and most of the objectives were achieved, technical participants
questioned the need for such detailed control.
Additional problems arose early in the operational phase because of a
L
division of the final planning effort, part being done at Eniwetok, while the —
major part was being undertaken at Johnston. Once the entire Task Force
closed in, this problem ceased to exist and important decisions were more .
readily available.
Test Facilities. Criteria for the design and construction of test facili-
ties estimates labor and equipment support required by TG 7.1 were
collected from the various Task Unit Commanders, Program Directors, and
Project Officers by the J-6 Section.
Conflicts were resolved, locations as-
signed, completion dates established, and the total requirement passed to
TG 7.5 for execution. In addition to the foregoing basic responsibility, J-6
also prepared the work orders necessary for the actual support of the various projects; operated a machine shop for the convenience of the expertimenters; and assigned tent, trailer, and laboratory space as required.
J-6 was basically composed of 7 men augmented locally by 4 men from
TU-1, 6 from TU-2, 6 from TU~-3, 4 from TU-4, and 3 from TU-5. At
times, personnel from the Task Units were designated to officially represent
J-6 at Bikini, Johnston Island, and Hawali.
From February 1958 until the close of the operation, J-6 personnel
from Task Units 1, 2, and 3 were present at every camp site and zero area
continuously.
On islands other than Elmer and Nan, the J-6 representatives
frequently assisted other agencies in accomplishing the over-all mission of
the Task Group,
During the summer and fall of 1957, the basic pattern of operations
was established and some firm criteria furnished to the AEC. Unfortunately,
the AEC did not receive its FY 58 budget money until late October. As a
consequence, much permanent accountable construction was delayed until] it
interfered with some of the scientific construction. However, most of the
scientific requirements were submitted late also. Construction lagged considerably behind planned dates, this being mainly the effect of nondelivery
85
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BY