(12)
Report on JCS recommendation on the Continental
Air Defense Operational Plan to determine the
manner of providing further strengthening of our
active defenses, including defense against submarine-launched missiles.
-
NOTE:
The above actions, together with NSC Action No. 1941,
as approved by the President, subsequently circulated
to all holders of NSC 5724 and NSC 5724/1; and referred for appropriate implementation as follows:
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2.
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To the Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tor, in collaboration with the Secretar-
ies of State, Defense and the Treasury,
the Director, ODM, the Director, Bureau
of the Budget, the Chairman, AEC, and the
Special Assistants to the President for
Science and Technology and for Public
Works Planning.
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fo the Director of Central Intelligence.
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To the Secretary of Defense.
SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY
The Director of Central Intelligence displayed a chart con-
taining a tabulation of Soviet missile tests during 1955, 1956 and
1957. He said that, on the basis of the best obtainable intelligence,
there had been a substantial dropping off in Soviet missile testing
recently. For example, there had been no ICEM test since early September; no test of an IRBM in the 950-mile range since August, and
few tests in the 150-mile range. Why had this decline in testing
occurred?
Did the Soviets feel they had "over-alerted" the United
States? Or were they holding tests which defeat our detection
methods?
The President said it would be logical to expect that test-
ing would increase if the first tests were successful.
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The President said that, shooting from the hip, he would be
inclined to think the Soviets were having some missile trouble. In
his experience, the higher the stage of development of a weapon, the
more frequent was the testing.
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Mr. Dulles said one would have expected more testing of the
ionger-range missiles.
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