conclusion was reached that it would be more economi~l in the majority of instances to return equipment rather than to attempt to preserve it for a two-year period. This particularly applied to equipment with metal paarts subject to rusting or corroding and, to a lesser degree, to other materials. Field Order No. 2, evolved by the Roll-Up Board, established basic policy and plans for closing out the operation and provided detailed procedures for disposition and for return of property and for the return of personnel. In addition, Field Order No. 2 fixed the responsibilities of the Task Group Commanders for the various aspects of the roll-up. CTG 7.2 was made responsible for preparations ashore for future tests on Eniwetok Atoll, and was directed to assist CTG 7.1 in its roll-up activities. TG 7.2 also was made responsible for disposition of its own personnel, property and records prior to departure from Eniwetok. This last requirement also was placed on Task Groups 7.3 and 7.4. TG 7.7 was directed to assist TG 7.4 in packing and crating and was made responsible for surf ace shipping from Kwajalein. All Task Group Commanders were required to submit withdrawal and roll-up plans based on Field Order No. 2. At the time of issuance of Field Order No. 2, on 8 March, preliminary conclusions indicated that a Post-Sandstone garrison would be required at Eniwetok if the area was to be given surveillance against intrusion. The Field Order contemplated this eventuality and made provisions therefor. An assumption was made that a 50-man garrison would provide a reasonable degree of security and plans were included for the housing and other needs for a garrison of this size. Plans for a larger garrison were later considered but discarded when it was decided that a physical guard on each of the three zero islands would not be required. As time went on, and the actual tests were conducted, it was developed that the recovery of any substantial amount of dssionable material by a foreign country would involve a considerable effort and for this reason physicai occupation of the target islands was not considered necessary. During the remainder of March and Ap-ril,~e~elo~rn;nt %f Post-Sandstone requirements continued to be perfected. On 28 April, General Hull, through the Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it be noted that preparations for the reception of a small garrison force were being accomplished by Joint Task Force Seven as a part of Sandstone roll-up. General Hull further recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1. ‘Approve the transf er of overall Post-Sandstone military responsibility for the Eniwetok Atoll b the Commander in Chief, Pacific, on or about 1 June 1948. 2. Obtain the concurrence of the AEC in a directive to CINCPAC effecting the transfer of responsibility and, thereafter, to issue the directive for implementation. 3. Make financial arrangements with AEC to defray the cost of housing the garrison and of any special items not normally borne by the armed services as a part of routine operations. In making these recommendations, General Hull pointed out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that since the nature of future tests was undetermined, only limited preparations appeared to be justified. Only such tasks for future tests which could be foreseen as meeting a reasonably firm requirement were recommended. 143 9alwhlN