:. ~. =-. for electronic and other maintenance work. Also, rehabilitation work at 13niwetok would thus be reduced. The drone aircraft were to land at Eniwetok after each operation where the radiological chemists would retrieve the air samples. The objection to this plan was that good drone operating weather had to prevail at both Kwajalein and Eniwetok to permit the conduct of a test. Another factor was the possibility of a malfunction of the drone-control system, the prospect of which would be aggravated by the two and one-half hour flight from Kwajalein. In view of these objections, tests were made to determine the feasibility of flying the drones manually to Eniwetok the afternoon before each test, after a final checking of all electronic equipment had been completed before take-off from Kwajaleim This plan was proved feasible during the Peter Xray practice and so was adopted. Briefings were held during this period aboard the USS Mt. McKinley, designed to acquaint the personnel of the Task Force with the parts the operating units were to play in the test operation. These briefings included discussion of the Air, Naval and Radiological safety operations to be conducted. Similar briefings were conducted at Kwajalein by Task Group 7.4. Task Group 7.3, the Naval Task Group, utilized the time remaining before Xray-Day to coordinate with Task Group 7.1 the tasks assigned to it for support of the tests. These included the movement of the personnel of the firing party from Parry Island to Engebi, and return. Other major assignments of the Naval Task Group included provision of a special surface security screen during actual test time and responsibility for evacuation of the lagoon. Maintenance of the air patrol durihg the tests also rested with Task Group 7.3. Other operations of the Naval Task Group were the maintenance of the small boat pool; operation of helicopters (during test periods helicopter operational control passed to the Commander, Air Forces) ; and operation of the LCM carrying a spare ground-sample recovery drone tank. In the operation of these tanks, control instruments were operated from a helicopter with spare equipment in the LCM in case the helicopter control failed. Test runs of the tank operation proved the feasibility of the helicopter control. During this pre-test period the international situation apparently became sufficiently grave as to raise the possibility of abandoning the tests.26 Consideration also was given to accelerating the tests. These questions confronted the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, because of a need to return the Task Force ships to Naval use, particularity the two AV’S. General Hull recommended to Washington however, that the tests proceed as scheduled. This recommendation was adopted. The tenseness of international affairs was reflected in the security aspects of the oPeration. It has already been stated that the surface and air anti-submarine screen was twice augmented. A total of eleven submarine contacts within the danger area were reported prior to test time. Evaluation of these contacts presented these conclusions: one actual submarine contact; two probable contacts; seven doubtful contacts and one report of own forces. On 10 March General Hull radioed the Chief of Staff, US Army, who was the Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Joint Task Force, pointing out that his i IS Daily record, Joint Task Force Seven. 121