SECTION
6
FORWARD DISPLACEMENT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
Begining in early January, 1948, the Main Headquarters of Joint Task Force Seven
gradually closed out and moved to Fort Shafter as the business of the various Staff Sections permitted. On 24 January, the Office of the Chief of Staff closed and a skeleton force
remained in the Washington Headquarters under the direction of General Barker to clean
up the final details. By 15 February both Deputy Commanders and the Staff had assembled at Fort Shafter, where the Main Headquarters was then opened, absorbing the Forward Headquarters. Simultaneously, Joint Task Force Seven, Rear, opened in Washington.
Primary business matters from 15 February to 8 March, when the Headquarters embarked for Eniwetok, were the formulation of roll-up plans and preparation for the move
to the area of operations.
Lt. Co.1L. J. Lincoln was designated to prepare plans on the roll-up for submission to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Armed Services and the AEC were detailed to assist Lt. Co]. Lincoln, the group constituting a “Roll-up Board.” Field Order
Number Two, establishing directives and policy for the roll-up was evolved by the board.
A paper was prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on “Post-Sandstone” responsibilities at Eniwetok, based on a directive to General Hull by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that the details of establishing a permanent atomic proving ground be worked out between
the Joint Task Force and the AEC. This directive resulted from a memorandum by Mr.
Lilienthal to the JCS, confirming that the AEC desired to make the Eniwetok test area a
permanent establishment.’”
The principal question involved in working out these details was that of determining
the most effective means of denying foreign agents access to the area, or denying such
agents the opportunity to obtain useful information regarding fissionable material. The
subsidiary questions of whether to attempt to obliterate the radiologically contaminated
areas to prevent access to information or to post a guard, or both, were involved. A full
dress conference of AEC scientists and Joint Task Force staff members on 7 March failed
to reach final conclusions. This matter was destined to be a major consideration during
the remainder of the Operation.
Development of a military check list for the operation was effected during the period
the Main Headquarters was at Fort Shafter. This check list detailed, step by step, the actions to be taken during the test periods and later proved to be invaluable.
Meanwhile, the major elements of the Naval Task Group had assembled at Terminal
Island and the Air Task Group was in the process of staging at Hamilton Air Force Base,
California, for movement to Kwajalein, where it was based for test operations.
On 28 February the USS Bairoko (CVE 115) departed from San Diego, where it had
taken aboard the helicopters for the operation and proceeded to Terminal Island. In company with the Command ship, the USS Mount McKinley (AGC–7), and the USS Curtis
(AV-4), the Bairoko sailed on 29 February, escorted by the SS Duncan (DD-874).
‘6Detailed Discussion contained in Section 13.
55