TASKS LAID BEFORE PROOF-TEST COMMITTEE
A basic concept of requirements for the operation was enunciated by Chairman Lilienthal of the AEC in his memorandum of 28 July 1947 to the Military Liaison Committee
which envisioned the following:
1. Recommendations regarding a location for the test.
2. A unit of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to assist in the transportation,
assembly, and final placement of the weapon.
3. An airplance drone unit to provide eight drone aircraft to take chemical samples of
the bomb cloud immediately after detonation, and transport aircraft to carry samples from
test location to Los Alamos Laboratory.
4. The designation of a planning group or commander with the Armed Forces with
whom plans could be made for logistical support, surface and air transportation, service
personnel, ships, landing craft, etc.
5. Engineer troops to engage in the preparation of detonation, control and instrument
sites.
6. A unit to engage in both high speed and general photography.
7. A health unit to monitor radiations and to ensure the safety of those employed in
the vicinity of radioactive materials.
From this concept, a basic policy’ was evolvqi by the Military Liaison Committee, and
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This policy provided:
1. Suggested responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission to include responsibility for instrumentation for the tests and technical responsibility for the operation.
2. Emphasis on the need for security.
3. A statement that Air Force components expected to participate in the test would
require at least six months of preparation between the submission of a directive and the
execution of it.
It was also pointed out in the basic policy that, since proof testing of atomic weapons
carries with it the handicap imposed by radioactive contamination, the tests should be
conducted outside the continental limits of the IJnited States. This was in conformance
with a Presidential directive of 28 July which specified that the tests would be conducted
in the Pacific Ocean area.
This policy of the Military Liaison Committee further emphasized that one of the
main reasons for requesting proof-testing at this time was to enable the scientists to carry
on instrumentation to determine:
1. Blast characteristics.
2. Peak temperature.
3. Instantaneous intensities of gamma rays and of neutrons.
The Military Liaison Committee’s statement of policy anticipated many other requirements, some of which were general in nature and other which were specific:
Ground and air photography should be obtained, but the requirement therefor should
not influence the timing of the shot. The interests of safety demanded that the meteoro‘
JCS 1795 series.
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