REPORT
TO THE
COMMANDER,
DEPUTY
COLIM.hVDER
FORCES,
JOINT
JOIXT
TASK
AND CO\l~l.lNDER
TASK FORCE
FORCE
SE$’EX,
BY THE
-AND COXIIIANDER,
AIR
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1. Organization:
At the close of Sandstone operations which were conducted under your command with
outstanding success, I believe that the following comments are pertinent. They are offered
with the hope that they will be of advantage to those who may be charged with the next
operation of a similar nature.
Every effort should be made to have representatives from all three departments report
at the same time. The Staff should be assembled completely with all members present so
that policies and principles may be enunciated to all, and so that internal instructions can
be accomplished without the necessity of repeating each time a new Staff Officer arrives.
This Staff should, insofar as possible, be composed of people who have had experience in
Sandstone or Crossroads, or at”least should be composed of individuals with some experience in joint operations. It is believed that all operations of one type should be under one
subordinate commander. For example, air operations are identical in the Army, Navy or in
the Ground Forces. Generally speaking, the problems of training and maintenance within
the squadrons and groups are very similar in each service. A great deal of time will be
saved if one headquarters can make all decisions pertinent to the overall plan. In the long
run, I believe that a more efficient operation can be conducted.
11. Deput> Commanders:
These should have specific duties and responsibilities. They should have supervision
for the accomplishment of the assigned duties under the joint commander as well as those
of a general advisory nature which the joint commander may avail himself of if he deems it
advisable. Their functions should be set forth in publications so that the joint staff members may be fully aware of their responsibilities. If deputy commanders represent their respective departments, they should be empowered to act for that department when matters
of joint interests arise. If they are to be instructed before acting in each case, then communications of an appropriate type should be provided for that purpose.
111. Security:
During Sandstone, the maximum possible security was obtained and results were highly
satisfactory. However, the carrying out of these security measures was endured at the
at the expense of a great deal of extra work and with some loss in efficiency at the lower
levels. I believe this to be dangerous and impractical in actual war operations. Therefore,
it cannot be taken as a pattern for combat even though it did succeed in Sandstone. Here
we could afford the IOSSof time incurred in each instance, while in combat we could not.
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