Chapter |—Executive Summary ¢ 7 The acceptability of the remaining risk will depend on public confidence in the nuclear testing program. This confidence currently suffers from a lack of confidence in the Department of Energy emanating from problemsat nuclear weaponsproduction facilities and from radia- the occurrenceoftests, the justification for such secrecy is questionable.’ pheric testing program. In the case of the present undergroundnuclear testing program, this mistrust is exacerbated by DOE’s reluctance to disclose information concerning the testing program, and by the knowledgethat notall tests releasing radioactive material to the atmosphere residents near the test site to independently tion hazards associated with the past atmos- (whatever the amount or circumstances) are announced. Asthe secrecy associated with the testing program is largely ineffective in preventing the dissemination of information concerning Thebenefits ofpublic dissemination of informa- tion have been successfully demonstrated by the EPAinthe area of radiation monitoring. Openly available community monitoring stations allow verify information released by the government, thereby providing reassurance to the community at large. In a similar manner, public concern over the testing program could be greatly mitigated if a policy were adopted whereby all tests are announced,or at least all tests that release radioactive material to the atmosphere (whatever the conditions) are announced. 8See for example: Riley R. Geary, *‘Nevada Test Site's dirtylittle secrets,”” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1989, pp. 35-38.