Chapter |—Executive Summary ¢ 7
The acceptability of the remaining risk will
depend on public confidence in the nuclear
testing program. This confidence currently suffers from a lack of confidence in the Department
of Energy emanating from problemsat nuclear
weaponsproduction facilities and from radia-
the occurrenceoftests, the justification for such
secrecy is questionable.’
pheric testing program. In the case of the present
undergroundnuclear testing program, this mistrust is exacerbated by DOE’s reluctance to
disclose information concerning the testing
program, and by the knowledgethat notall tests
releasing radioactive material to the atmosphere
residents near the test site to independently
tion hazards associated with the past atmos-
(whatever the amount or circumstances) are
announced. Asthe secrecy associated with the
testing program is largely ineffective in preventing the dissemination of information concerning
Thebenefits ofpublic dissemination of informa-
tion have been successfully demonstrated by the
EPAinthe area of radiation monitoring. Openly
available community monitoring stations allow
verify information released by the government,
thereby providing reassurance to the community
at large. In a similar manner, public concern
over the testing program could be greatly
mitigated if a policy were adopted whereby
all tests are announced,or at least all tests
that release radioactive material to the atmosphere (whatever the conditions) are announced.
8See for example: Riley R. Geary, *‘Nevada Test Site's dirtylittle secrets,”” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1989, pp. 35-38.