, Leo M. Krulitz October_30, 1979 Page Two . At our request, architect Carlton Hawpe (who speaks Marshallese and English) was engaged by Holmes & Narver and Holmes & Narver was engaged to assist in the drafting of the master In November 1973, the plan was plan. It went very well. one at It included two major settlements: completed. Enewetak island in ‘the south and the other at Enjebi. Enjebi was included because that is what the people wanted and because no one in the government even suggested that Enjebi could not be included. In September 1974., wh~n General Warren D. Johnson, then DNA director, came to Enewetak atoll to meet with the people and present the draft environmental impact statement, the people were informed for the first time that the Atomic Energy Commission recommended against the resettlement of Enjebi and would oppose the funding of the entire program if Enjebi were included. General Johnson was accompanied by high level representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of the Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Trust Territory Government. It was clear to all of us, that *is to the people of Enewetak It was a and their counsel, that we had no real choice. matter of acceding to the AEC “recommendation” and revisin9 the Master Plan to cut Enjebi out, or having no cleanuP and resettlement program at all. EIS, yol. I S7. . The people of Enewetak returned to Ujelang to revise the Master Plan, to move everyone to residences in the southern islands of Enewetak, Medren and Japtan. That was not an eaSy accommodation to ach,ieve, even though they are a remarkably cohensive and cooperative group, but it worked out and the revised Master Plan of March 1975 excluded II, Tab D. Enj ebi. EIS, vol. I want to make it very clear that the people of Enewetak never did agree to forego the resettlement of Enjebi. They acceded to it at the time because they hadno real choice. To be sure, the “Case 3“, which excluded Enjebi, See draft EIS S5.4.3. was presented as a “recommendation.” But the AEC had made up its mind unilaterally, in advance, and without the support of the AEC, the government’s radiation experts, prospects for funding of the program were scant if not nonexistent.