1. BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAMS
(HS? Actions Nos. 1433-a-(4), 1s84, 1615, 1653, 1690, 1743,
a
1765, 1800 and 1846)
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the subject, and called
upon the Secretary of Defense. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing
note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached
to this memorandum.)
Secretary McElroy said the Defense presentation would be
given by Mr. Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles, Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Holaday then made a presentation with charts.
(A copy
of Mr. Holaday's presentation is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)
a
At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Cutler noted
that Mr. Holaday had displayed charts showing the following figures:
393 IRBMs, 173 Polaris missiles, and 272 ICBMs. Mr. Cutler asked
whether these figures were larger than the figures previously re-~
ported because of the inclusion in the larger figure of training
and test missiles. Mr. Holaday answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Cutler said the purpose of his question was to point
out that the operational capability figures approved by the President last week were smaller than the figures displayed by Mr. Holaday because the operational capability figures did not include
training and test vehicles.
Secretary McElroy noted that production of missiles had
begun in advance of acquiring the research and development knowledge which, ideally, should be available in advance of production.
He believed the decision to start production was correct, but
wished to point out that this decision would probably entail increased expense because of design changes in the course of production. He was being pressed to move even faster, especially on
Polaris, which was an attractive deterrent weapons system. The
first firing of a complete Polaris would not take place until
October 1959, but three Polaris submarines with missiles had already been ordered. One Senator had suggested that 100 submarines
should be ordered. As we go farther down the research and development road we may have to take further gambles, but the present
gamble is as big as the Department of Défense can recommend now.
If test firings were successful, Secretary McElroy hoped to recommend expansions of the missiles program.
-2-
pap |
p
SOR
eR
‘TOP SECRE!
Fas
aay
:
be Y