TOP. SECRET 5. U. 8. POLICY TOWARD IRA¥ Rec 5508; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1624-c, 1667 and 1753; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U. 8. Aid Programs”, dated December 5, 1956; NIE 34-57; HSC 5703; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U., 5. Policy Toward Iran", dated February 6, 1957; NSC 5703/1; Memo for NSC from Acting Execu- tive Secretary, subject: "Military Implications of Joint Reso- lution 117 on the Middle East", dated June 27, 1957; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East", dated July 16, 1957; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Iran", dated August 5 and 7, 1957) Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, going into particular de‘tail on the new Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1 and on the construction costs to the United States for new military facilities in Iran. He then read the Planning Board's recommendations for Council action on the Iranian policy, and noted the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the actions proposed by the Planning Board. (Copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.) ee a ident then said that the proposed new policy seemed perfectly proper to hin. me fo ™ ro ev 4 e. ° eS: a. . of " : wn Mr. Brundage said that he was concerned by the figures in the Financial Appendix, which showed an increase year after year. Would it not be better to try to hold down the rate of expenditures in Iran to the level of PY 1958 and Fy 1959, at least until such time as the world-wide review of our military assistance programs had been completed by the Defense Department? Mr. Brundage warned that once such expenditures as these begin to grow, it is very difficult to reverse the direction. Secretary Wilson disagreed with Mr. Brundage, and expressed the view that it would be sound to go ahead and adopt the pronosed new policy with respect to Iran, trying to find the additional money somewhere else. After all, Iran was pretty important to the United States. ne be CEDae ; ie wo * -~5- f TOP SECRET a a i = a fl i H oe. a o 9ae D this . - a ig Mee kites neni teats vim om. uN A ae % :