until decay reached the acceptable release value of 10 mr/hr. An added decontamination fea-
ture of this outside contaminated storage was a daily rain shower typical of this area.
The release of vehicles and equipment reading less than 10 mr/hr still provided problems
when these items were movedinto the technical areas or shipped to the United States. Sensitive counting equipment immediately detected low-level contamination when contaminated items
were moved into technical areas. This consequent increase in background jeopardized lowlevel decay measurements, and therefore items were moved from this sensitive area. Decontamination of items to lower levels would have been difficult and impractical.
Since everything and everyone in the northern Marshall Islands had become more or Jess
radiologically contaminated, the continental shipping tolerances of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Post Office Department became a problem. It is not amiss to say that all
packages, persons, and letters returning from the Marshall Islands were contaminated in excess
of background radiation. Although not a health hazard, this could have resulted in bad publicity
if certain agencies had detected and publicized this nuisance. It was for this reason that the
sale of shipping containers from the Pacific Proving Grounds to the general public was restricted,
Interstate Commerce Commission regulations state that all shipments of radioactive isotopes in commercial carriers must be packaged so that no significant alpha or beta radiation
is emitted from the exterior of the package and the gamma radiation at any surface of the
package must be less than the equivalent of 10 mr of radium gamma radiation filtered through
14 in. of lead for 24 hr. This meant, in many cases, a waiting period in excess of four months
between the release from contaminated storage and the acceptable shipment of items by common carrier in the United States.
Because, in many cases, using agencies were unwilling to wait this period of decay,
courier service was utilized since this service is free of all Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations, provided that a common carrier is not used.
Personnel decontamination progressed satisfactorily throughout the Task Group, although
there were many objections to slightly contaminated salt-water showers. Since the majority of
personnel were advised to take daily hygienic showers aboard ship, only one instance of beta
burns occurred in the Task Force. These burns werefound on the abdominal belt line of
several members of the Bairoko air operations department. These men had beenontheflight
deck during the period of!Aad fall-out, and they did not shower for about 12 hr after exposure. The use of protectiveclothing would have prevented the small circular patches that appeared on the abdomens of these men. All burns were minor in nature.
Other than aboard the Ainsworth, the arrangement of change room and showerfacilities
aboard ship did not minimize the spread of contamination. Contaminated individuals, in many
cases, had to walk through the ships in order to reach the contaminated change room or
showers. The barge facilities adjacent to the Ainsworth provided the most ideal system for the
control of contamination aboard ship.
6.4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.4.1
Conclusions
1. Present methods of field decontamination are adequate.
2. Present maximum permissible contamination limits should be reevaluated from the
overseas test standpoint.
3. Change room and shower facilities for personnel decontamination aboard ship should be
redesigned,
6.4.2
Recommendations
1. Studies should be initiated to determine health hazards from handling, inhalation, and
ingestion of low-level fission-product contamination.
2. Personnel decontamination facilities should be investigated and constructed prior to
operations in order to maximize contamination control aboard ship.
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