Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird
-2-
to fire on what might be referred to as abnormal conditions,
i.e., with some appreciable wind components from the south.
It might be said that we could fire at Taongi under more stable
weather conditions and more positive predictable weather con-
ditions.
In addition to its superior position with respect to
prevailing winds, the increased distances to populated islands
are a distinct advantage from the safety aspect for two reasons.
First, in case of fallout on any populated areas, the levels
will be lower; and second, there will be appreciably more time
to take emergency action. The comparable distances for Bikini
and Taongi are:
,
Bikini
Taongi.
Eniwetok
190
TS
Rongelap
80
260
310
290
Utirik
We believe there are some features of the UCRL proposal that
raise further operational questions. For example, one of the
Laboratories finishes its shots and recovery then they contemplate
rescheduling and possibly relocation within Eniwetok, Bikini, or
Taongi to the best over-all advantage and diminishing of overell time. ‘Therefore, flexibility in scheduling should be maintained.
We consider the UCRL estimate of time for HARDTACK being equal
to REDWING as being overly optimistic. A detonation schedule,
even using Taongi, averaging less than three days per shot is
questionable. Also, their estimate of damage to result from a
25 - 40 MT shot is open to question.
Past experience leads to
the conclusion that damage estimates’ have been both over and under
in the results.
We believe that the HARDTACK support requirement of Task Group 7.5
and other Task Force elements will amount to a 25% or 35% increase
over REDWING. This is based on a 31-shot series for HARDTACK vs.
a i7-shot series for REDWING. However, it is agreed that there
will be some offsetting advantages to increased TG 7.5 support
requirements for Taongi as a result of decreased evacuation demands
at Bikini.
pos
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