Redwing chart by the omission of a dotted line called "Scientific Supervision"
the AEC to the Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters to Task
Groupe 7.1 and 7.5.
The TG 7.1 organization for Hardtack, shown in Fig. 3.2, represented
a change from the Redwing organization in the following respects:
1. Task Units were reduced from twelve to six by absorbtion of the
assembly and documentary photography functions within the major Task Units
and by. establishing Arming and Firing as a special staff office instead of a
Task Unit. Task Units 1 to 4 remained major programmatic Task Units;

Task Unit 5 continued to provide all timing and firing and to do some experimental work for Task Units 1, 2 and 3; and Task Unit 6 provided the
usual rad-safe services.
2. Additional Deputy Commanders were provided, which somewhat
facilitated independent operations in two locations, and later three, when

Johnston Island was added.
3. On October 1, 1957, Gaelen L. Felt, CTG 7.1, terminated his employment at LASL,

Don B. Shuster, of the Sandia Corporation, replaced him

as Task Group Commander. As a result, each of the five major Task Units
was represented in the Command Section. Neither the Commander nor any
of the deputies performed any special Task Group functions for their parent
organizations,
4. During the operational phase, Task Unit 7 was added to take care
of a UN shot, which failed to materialize. Because of the purpose and na-~

ture of the shot, the limited amount of data to be acquired, and the fact that
much of the preparation was outside the Task Force organization, Task Unit

7 bore little resemblance to any of the others.
Command relationships were closer to the military pattern than they

were to those for operations at the Nevada Test Site.

However, one impor-

tant difference from normal military command relationships was that the
TG 7.1 concept of operations and operation plans stemmed from the device

and weapon programs and experimental programs of the Laboratories and
the DOD, over the composition and extent of which the Task Group and Task
Force had little or no control. In the normal military operation the commander formulates plans from the very beginning of the operation; the plans
of subordinates stem from these. Because of these differences and since
support of the TG 7.1 effort was among the principal functions of the Task
Force and other Task Groups, their plans and operations depended in many

ways on those of 7.1.

The Commander, JTF 7, authorized direct relationships among the
various Task Groups once he had established policy and major items of
support. Relationships of TG 7.1 with the Joint Task Force and with the
other Task Groups were good and resuited in generally excellent support
for the accomplishment of 7.1 missions.
Relationships within TG 7.1 were close and cordial. During the planning stage the Task Group Commander and members of his staff made fre-

quent visits to the Field Command, AFSWP, and UCRL, and to Program and
Project sites as necessary, to get first-hand information cn plans and re-

quirements and to ensure operational feasibility, safety, coordination, and
adequate support.

Many visitors were received from the Task Units, Pro-

grams and Projects.

Necessary meetings were held at locations most con-

venient for the bulk of the participants -- Los Alamos, Albuquerque, Liver-

61

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