reef nes Johnston Island. Many of the parts were recovered by skin diving and the type“wifailure was deduced, if not the primary cause. 2. The two Viper U-Arrow IJ beacon carrying rockets failed at first- burnout and fell back onto the western half of Johnston Island. A subtest firing verified this failure. 3. The displaced burst point was outside the beam of the antenna receiving the 4 KMo diagnostic signal and no information was received. The signal, though weak, was seen at the receiving station, and operation of this system was verified by the 200 Me monitor telemetry. 4. Two of the instrument carriers, the 50,000- and 80,000-ff stations were not recovered. The RF signals indicated the chutes operated satisfactorily, but the long time spent in searching for other nose cones and pods may have allowed these two noses to take on water and sink. The displaced burst caused the stations to be considerably outside of the intended interest areas, but it appears that most of the desired data will be forthcoming from the records and the four recovered noses. The amount of optical data lost has not been determined at this time. After Teak, Program 32 was asked to participate in the Orange shot to a larger extent than was originally intended. No attenuation measurements or instrument carriers were originally scheduled for Orange. The measurements and instrumentation actually attempted on Orange test are as follows: 1. Four radchem samplers. 2. Three instrument carriers, one at 80,000 ff altitude and 95,000 ft horizontally displaced from the burst, and two at burst altitude, one 40,000 ff north and one 40,000 ft west of air zero, 3. Eight Deacon-Arrow II RF attenuation rockets. 4. MIDOT tracking of the three instrument carriers, two of the beacon carriers, and the Redstone. 5. The 4 KMc diagnostic measurement. 6. Photo coverage as on Teak plus documentary coverage from French Frigate Shoals. 7. Warhead. Equipment operated and results were obtained as follows: 1. The four samplers were recovered, but only the sample collected 40 sec after burst contained any activity. Analysis by LASL will determine if this was adequate. 2. Telemetered data from the three instrument carriers appears satisfactory. The station 40,000 ff north of the burst was not recovered. 3. Only seven RF attenuation rockets were fired. Three 225 Mc sys- tems recorded good data. The 1500 Mc resulta are not yet known. 4. MIDOT tracking was good. 5. The 4 KMc diagnostic measurements gave transit time and may give a figure for early alpha. 6. 7. The photo coverage was lost because of cloud coverage. The warhead apparently operated as expected. Program 34, Sandia Support Project 34.1 was responsible for the telemetry of high-time-resolution data relative to several areas of interest. Of primary importance among