tional injuries were mainly from volleyball, tennis, and water sports. Oc- cupational injuries were mostly from striking stationary objects, the use of hand tdéols, and falls. Six men suffered minor injuries in four vehicle incidents. There were no fires in TG 7.1 facilities or equipment during the operation. Special Comment. A recommendation from a previous report is repeated: In future operations consideration should be given to using safety personne]from major participating laboratories, integrating them with individuals who have had previous test operation experience. Such integration should be complete enough to function for the benefit of all elements of the Scientific Task Group without excessive duplication of personnel and efforts. Participating organizations should select test personnel with the proper physical qualifications to meet the demands of the test site environment. The specifications of the Administrative Plan medical requirements are strict enough if interpreted properly. New test personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated and oriented with respect to the peculiar hazards and different environment of the test site. A new magazine area should be built on the north end of Parry Island to accommodate the small quantities of hazardous materials and explosives used by TG 7.1. Separate buildings should be constructed in order to store incompatible materials properly. The area should be surrounded by a fence to enclose loaded trailers of hazardous materials. All plans for new structures and facilities should be examined for personnel safety. Safety considerations have been particularly lacking in structures designed for housing personnel. It should be realized by test site personnel that proper driving practices and reasonable care of Government motor vehicles are the responsibilities of the individual, and particularly of his supervisor. In the past these responsibilities have been taken lightly by some people. Disciplinary action should be instituted against those who drive in an unsafe manner and those who negligently abuse Government equipment. Consideration should be given to assigning a Safety Advisor to the Staff of the Joint Task Force. This individual could coordinate the various safety activities and resolve the conflicts that sometime exist between regulations established by different organizations. This Safety Advisor should have a broad background in varied safety work, stature in the field, and previous test site experience. The Safety Officers report a completely cooperative response in dealings with Task Group 7.1 personnel at Johnston Island. 3.18 DISPOSITION OF FORCES (ROLL-UP) Personnel of the Task Group began to be gradually redepioyed from the EPG to the ZI during the last 2 weeks of April. This redeployment followed the decision to move the Teak and Orange events to Johnston Island and continued through the middle of August 1958. Following the detonation of Fig (the last event) on August 18, 1958, the remaining personnel phased out rapidly. ’ Phase-out of Personnel. Personnel phase-out estimates were obtained from the status reports submitted by various elements of the Task Group during the planning phase of the operation, beginning in July of 1957 and ending in February 1958, with the submission of the last status report. How111