the workload, and many exchange badges were prepared in advance which were never used. Clearances. Joint Task Force Seven SOP 205-3, "Security Clearances, " required each TG 7.1 participant to possess a Secret or Top Secret military clearance, or an active Q clearance. Verification of these clearances was required by J-1 before travel orders authorizing entry into the EPG could be issued. This verification was obtained from three areas: 1*“AEC Contractor Personnel: Q-cleared personnel were indicated on the status reports emanating from the subordinate organizations. These lists were compiled at intervals and forwarded to TG 7.5 to be confirmed. Task Group 7.5 then notified the Military Executive, J-1, of the confirmation. 2. Military and DOD Civilian Personnel: The Military Executive, J-1, was responsible for the verification of clearances on all DOD personnel assigned to TG 7.1 except for those under the operational control of TU-3. This verification was obtained from the cognizant security officer. As a member of J-2 of JTF 7, the Military Executive, J-1, also had the authority to grant military clearances in certain instances. Clearances granted by the Military Executive totaled 37, two of them crypto clearances. 3. TU-3 Military, DOD Civilian, and DOD Contractor Personnel: Personnel under the operational control of Task Unit 3 were certified for access to RD by FC, AFSWP. Since this organization was responsible for the issuance of its own overseas travel orders, verification of clearances was ac- complished by the unit. Requests. Joint Task Force Seven SOP 205-6 outlined procedures to be followed for badging. The processing of badges was a simple operation except for numerous changes and resubmissions, and no major problems were encountered. Occasionally an individual arrived at the EPG before his badge request did; in these cases an OUO message was sent and a badge request form was prepared on the site. Photographs were provided by the subordinate units, and badges were fabricated at EPG from the badge request information. Compliance with CINCPAC Serial 020. CINCPAC Serial 020, dated April 1, 1952, "Eniwetok Atoll; Security Instructions,defines the general security requirements for entry into the EPG. All TG 7.1 personnel had to be certified, under the provisions of paragraph 4, as "good security risks." This determination was based on certification that each individual was mentally and emotionally stable; that he possessed the integrity, discretion, and responsibility essential to the security of classified information; that his reputation and records revealed no information which tended to indicate any degree of disloyalty to the United States; and that he had been thoroughly indoctrinated in existing instructions for the security of classified military information. Each individual was certified by immediate superiors to Los Alamos, to TU~3, or to Livermore under the provisions of the letter. Compiled lists were submitted periodically to JTF 7, CINCPAC, the TG 7.1 LNO's, and to TG 7.2. When the time element demanded, wire messages were sent. Each travel order published by TG 7.1 also certified each individual as required. During Hardtack a total of 2374 certifications were submitted by roster, and 340 by wire message. Although the procedures in use during the operations were repetitious and frequently ponderous, no particular problems were posed, and in no case was entry denied as a result of a breakdown in the system. Paragraph 4c of the letter defined itema classified as contraband mate107