CHAPTER |, SECTIONS 1 and2 Precautionary measures against blast damage, wave action, and radioactive contamination were taken as dictated by probable test yields. However, after the initial shot (Bravo - Station 20) on 1 March 1954, all pre-test plans were photographic and other recording stations had to be abandoned or added to meet the requirements for the changed zero stations. Radioactive contamination necessitated a new barge, Station greatly modified. 1840.01, on a reef near How, in lieu of Station 1820.02. The unexpected destruction of facilities and the intensity of the residual radioactive contamination resulting from the Bravo detonation The principal resultant problem to the Contractor was the disposition of his forces, particularly the abrupt shift from a land-based necessitated changes in the test program. Changes were made in the shot sequences; also, Station 90 was moved to the Charlie crater; Station 10 to the Flora crater; and a number of to a ship-based operation at Bikini. The adapt- ation was successfuly made for the limited duration involved. SECTION 2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS All of the foregoing narrative summary is extracted from text treated in more complete detail in following sections of this report. The principal difficulties reported in OP- ERATION CASTLE appear to have been related, directly or indirectly, to the scheduling of the preoperational phases of construction. The problems derive from the nature of the project. The remoteness of the site, the lead time necessary for procurement and mobilization, the difficulty of effective distribution of men and equipment on widely dispersed areas, and trans- port over the considerable water separation, all contribute to a rather extended construction period. Yet, in the earlier phases of the pre- operational period, few criteria are firm except the end date, which, being inflexible, demands careful planning. Detailed schedules based on firm scope are not possible until late in a pro- gram when they were often too late for effectiveness, and early schedules tend to be frag- mentary. However, experience in the problems of GREENHOUSE and IVY has enabled the Contractor increasingly to anticipate and evaluate missing factors, and thus make realistic forecasts. The momentum ofscientific progress, continuing to the moment of a test, makes most of the resulting engineering and construction problems inherent in the project. Although the operational phase was changed in scope as a result of the first detonation, the rapid solution of the problems which followed indicated that the existing procedural techniques and organizational set-up, were functional and flexible enough to accommodate not only an orderly progression in the operation, but also radical changes in plans. Therefore, extended recommendations do not appear to be indicated. Page 1-10 There are a few refinements, from the Contractor’s standpoint, that might produce some saving of time and money in other operations. Accordingly, the following is offered for consideration in planning future test programs. 1. Experience gained during OPERATION CASTLEindicates the need for more direct control by the Contractor over contract employees in the matter of radiation exposure. It is therefore believed desirable to establish within Task Group 7.5 a non-military RadSafe unit which would be responsible for the regulation of safety measures within the Task Group. 2. In the development of design criteria, it is believed that the Contractor’s personnel should work in close proximity with the actual design groups at the University of Cali- fornia Radiation Laboratory and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in order to expedite the development of criteria and, also, to help the Scientific Groups formulate design require- ments along lines which could result in simpli- fication or standardization of construction procedures and materials, thus resulting in over-all savings in time and money. 3. As a means of reducing the number of personnel in the advance elements of the Task Groups assigned to the Forward Area, con- sideration might be given to instructing the Contractor to assume additional responsibil- ities in the handling, processing, andbilleting of personnel; in warehousing of User’s equipment and supplies; and in other related functions at the Pacific Proving Ground which involve duplication of function, and for which the Contractor is already established.