CHAPTERIII, SECTION 6 cant resided in the local area for at least the last ten years. The “QE” also was based upon the results of a local and sometimes a national check by agencies. Both types of clearances were strictly temporary, and the prior approval of the Field Manager, Eniwetok Field Office, had to be secured before processing could be started. Simultaneously with the request for either the Local “P” or the “QE” Clearance, a formal request was madefor the conventional “P” or ‘“‘Q.” Where the applicant had previously been granted a “Q” Clearance with another activity and his “Q” Clearance had lapsed, a “Q” Reinstatement was requested. At the inception of OPERATION CASTLE, each employee was required to have at least a “Pp” Approval before he was authorized to enter the Pacific Proving Ground. During May, 1953, the Eniwetok Field Office notified Holmes & Narver that, subsequent to 1 January 1954, no individual would be allowed to enter the Pacific Proving Ground nor remain at the PPG without a “Q” Clearance. To plan for compliance with this directive, it was decided that requests for “Q” Clearances should be made prior to 1 September 1953 for employees who would be at the Pacific Proving Ground subsequent to the cutoff date. Accordingly in only a few instances of emergency were individuals allowed to proceed to the PPG after 1 September 1953 if they had not been placed in process for a “Q’’ Clearance prior to that date. All security papers necessary for obtaining clearances were submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission’s Los Angeles Security Branch. Prior to the submission of security papers each applicant was screened from a professional and character standpoint to determine his eligibility for further processing. This screening was accomplished not only by contacting previous employers and personal references, but also by utilizing two national private investigative agencies. As a result of information received from these sources, approximately 11% of the applicants were removed from security processing. Information obtained from local law enforcement and Federal Agencies in the area was helpful in weeding out those individuals who could not meet established security requirements. Of the 4,293 requests for “P” Approvals, 2,979 were granted; of the 4,288 requests for “Q’” Clearances, 1,329 were granted. Of the 450 requests for “Q’’ Reinstatements, 444. were received; 425 requests for Local “P’’ Approvals were requested and received. The average time required for AEC processing of “P” Approvals was 36.03 days; for ‘“‘Q” Clearances, 101.72 days; for “Q” Reinstatements, 18.82 days; and for Local “P” Approvals, 4.5 days. A meeting was held 9 April 1953, attended by representatives of the H&N Security Department, AEC Security representatives from the Santa Fe Operations Office, and from the AEC Los Angeles Security Branch, wherein it was decided that all clearances would be cancelled by the AEC Los Angeles Security Branch ninety days after the date of granting unless the individual had been placed on the Holmes & Narver payroll by that time. A similar provision pertained to terminating employees; their clearances lapsed unless they were re-hired within ninety days. In order to affect this procedure a form was prepared for each hired applicant, setting forth the individual's full name, his AEC number, his next of kin and address of next of kin, and the individual’s type of clearance. This form was transmitted to the AEC Los Angeles Security Branch, the Eniwetok Field Office Security Representative at the Pacific Proving Ground, and the Eniwetok Field Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The form served not only to notify all concerned that H&N was employing the applicant, but also to notify the Department of State of the overseas travel of an individual. Upon hiring of an individual, either in the Home Office or at Jobsite, his clearance status was made known to his super- visor. Entry into the Pacific Proving Ground was controlled by the Commander-in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and in order to gain entry, an individual had to be certified as a good security risk. The Port Control Director, Long Beach Naval Station, was the Military representative authorized to sign all overseas identification cards andall travel orders for individuals traveling to the Pacific Proving Ground. In May 1953, when H&N was advised that any employees who would be at the Pacific Proving Ground subsequent to 1 January 1954 would require a “Q’” clearance, the Security Department requested the AEC to commence processing applicants for “‘Q”’ clearances. However, requests for “Q” clearance processing on applicants was suspended until “P” approvals were received, thus precluding a costly “Q” clearance processing on those individuals who would not be granted a ““P” approval. It was decided that all employees signing one year contracts after 1 June 1953 would be placed in process for “Q” clearances. By 15 June 1953, the Jobsite had selected those “P” approved personnel who were desired after the “cut-off” date, and they were placed in process for “Q” clearances. After 15 August 1953, all applicants whose services were required after the ‘“‘cut-off’ date were placed in process for a “QP” clearance. The date 1 September 1953 had been es- tablished early in the Operation as the “limiting date,” after which an individual normally could not proceed to the Pacific Proving Ground unless he was in process for a ‘“Q” clearance. Changes in the planning during August 1953 Page 3-33