1 L Wk mticipateci. These features made the or%~~ cost estimates inaccurate from the start. Below are major it@ms which developed as the planning m d @ Vihichcould be anticipated in the first estimates: progressed,none o. Q,100,0OO ~~avalResearch Laboratory - work for LC Adti.istrationof Lative Affairs 50,000 Public ;~orks,etc., at Kwajalein /+88,500 Causeway and Tower base constructionat tiiwetok no, 500 Ship conversion,reconversion,activation, cieactivztio~etc.505,000 Nreau of Ships - Philco technicsl experts Conversion of E-17 Bombers 25,000 500,000 ti late i~ovember,owinc to a feeling that expendituresmQht be get~ir,gout of ~Lmd, ~ effort was :nadeto obt~ informationas to how Lhe fur.dswere holding out. The report was to include obligations and expenditures up to, aridincluc!in~,30 l;ovember. It was hoped that this IIsnapshotllof condit~ns wodd Give some idea of the fi.nanCid Pict~e. The reports were sup~sed to be in by 8 December,%ut were not all. received until.after 1 January. They were inconclusiveand definitely not worth the effort expended to obtain them - it was much too early in I the operation to establish even a trend. In Cecwaber it was thought that perhaps the Fiscal Agreement did rot define adequatelywhat should, and what should not, be charged to the S4XCid funds. AS a result, an addendw (Appendix E) was issued on 3 December which explained in greater detail what charges might be made. The first routti.emonthly report of obligations and expenditures (for I;ovember)was received on time (5 Jawry). About half a million . 4 ;ection XV I I