the radar beac~ao This source inCluded the provision fOr autocratic change-overin case of generator failure. The two SCR-~ radio sets installed in the Air Operations X’oomwere found to be quite valuable for ~fitori~ purposes. Direct communicationsto aircraft from this location was used upon several occasions. An additional set was installed to enable three frequenciesto be monitored simultaneously. At HOW Hour plus four minutes, one drone aircraft crashed into the sea. This crash was not attributed to failure of the radio controls from the mother aircraft. In the period following Xray Day noncal communicationswere maintained and no serious prwblems arose. The schedule for closing down circuits was discussed, but no fixm dates could be decided until more informationwas obtained on the plans fnr a permnent garrison force. Just prior to Yoke Day a message was received from USARPAC stating that OM of the task forcets assigned frequencies (5650 kcs) was interfering with a Far Eastern Air Force circuit between Japan ani Okinawa. They requested a reduction in the power output of the transmitter (this transmitterwas part of theAN/MRC-2). Rather than reduce power, it was decided to change frequency back to the original frequency (68’75kcs). Yoke Day closely duplicated Xray Day. All Air Force communica- tion facilities operated satisfactorilywith the exception of the rtiar beacon (A??/CPN-6)on the Zero Island. It appeared that there had been a power supply failure of the equipment at How minus ten (10) minutes. However, on checking withMr. Hedberg of the Atomic Energy Commission, it was definitely determined that no power failure had 130 Section ~