1
L
Wk
mticipateci. These features made the or%~~
cost estimates inaccurate
from the start. Below are major it@ms which developed as the planning
m
d
@ Vihichcould be anticipated in the first estimates:
progressed,none o.
Q,100,0OO
~~avalResearch Laboratory - work for LC
Adti.istrationof Lative Affairs
50,000
Public ;~orks,etc., at Kwajalein
/+88,500
Causeway and Tower base constructionat tiiwetok
no, 500
Ship conversion,reconversion,activation, cieactivztio~etc.505,000
Nreau of Ships - Philco technicsl experts
Conversion of
E-17
Bombers
25,000
500,000
ti late i~ovember,owinc to a feeling that expendituresmQht be
get~ir,gout of ~Lmd, ~ effort was :nadeto obt~
informationas to how
Lhe fur.dswere holding out. The report was to include obligations and
expenditures up to, aridincluc!in~,30 l;ovember. It was hoped that this
IIsnapshotllof
condit~ns wodd
Give some idea of the fi.nanCid Pict~e.
The reports were sup~sed to be in by 8 December,%ut were not all.
received until.after 1 January. They were inconclusiveand definitely
not worth the effort expended to obtain them - it was much too early in
I
the operation to establish even a trend.
In Cecwaber it was thought that perhaps the Fiscal Agreement did
rot define adequatelywhat should, and what should not, be charged to
the S4XCid funds. AS a result, an addendw (Appendix E) was issued on
3 December which explained in greater detail what charges might be made.
The first routti.emonthly report of obligations and expenditures
(for I;ovember)was received on time (5 Jawry).
About half a million
.
4
;ection XV
I
I